What If They Held A Reconciliation Party And Nobody Came?

By Cernig

Fareed Zakaria has a must-read essay today at Newsweek entitled "Stuck In The Iraqi Loop" in which he references one of General Petraeus' favorite scholar-warriors to explain the war supporters' dilemma over Iraq - the paradox that the Surge was supposed to give space for reconciliation and that would enable troop withdrawals, but we're now being told the Surge's gains are too fragile to risk withdrawing troops.

Making sense of this paradox is critical. Because in certain crucial ways things are not improving in Iraq, and unless they start improving soon, the United States faces the awful prospect of an unending peacekeeping operation—with continuing if limited casualties—for years to come.

In a brilliant and much-circulated essay written in August 2007, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," David Kilcullen, a veteran Australian officer who advised Gen. David Petraeus during the early days of the surge, wrote, "Our dilemma in Iraq is, and always has been, finding a way to create a sustainable security architecture that does not require 'Coalition-in-the-loop,' thereby allowing Iraq to stabilize and the Coalition to disengage in favorable circumstances." We have achieved some security in Iraq, though even this should not be overstated. (Violence is still at 2005 levels, which were pretty gruesome.) But we have not built a sustainable security architecture.

How does one create a self-sustaining process that leads to stability? Do we need more troops? Longer rotations? Kilcullen points in a different direction: "Taking the Coalition out of the loop and into 'overwatch' requires balancing competing armed interest groups at the national and local level." In other words, we need to help forge a political bargain by which Iraq's various groups agree to live together and not dominate one another.

But signs that anythink like such a political bargain is in the offing always turn out to be more hype than reality, all the while the "window of opportunity" is closing by even General Pteraeus' admission.

There was another major attempt at forging such a political compact due to begin today - but it's a failure before it has even begun, with key groups either not attending or saying it's all just government window-dressing with no real intent behind it.

A conference to reconcile Iraq's warring political groups began to unravel even before it got under way on Tuesday, with the main Sunni Muslim Arab bloc pulling out and protesting it had not been properly invited.

...The gathering, billed as the biggest of its kind in Iraq, aimed to bring leaders of rival factions together around much-delayed so-called laws meant to promote common cause between majority Shi'ites and minority Sunni Arabs.

The Accordance Front, the main Sunni Arab bloc, had said it would attend but pulled out as dozens of political leaders gathered at a hotel in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.

"The Front will not attend the conference, not because it does not believe in reconciliation ... but because the invitations were sent to members of the Front and not formally to the Accordance Front," spokesman Salim al-Jubouri said.

Jubouri said decisions from previous meetings had never been implemented. "How can we now arrange new proposals?," he said.

...The head of the Sadrist political bloc, Nassar al-Rubaie, arrived at the conference but refused to say whether he would take an active role.

"Such conferences are just government propaganda," Rubaie told Reuters.

...The Iraqi National List, a secular bloc headed by former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, had already said they would not attend.

The conference was open to members of Saddam Hussein's now outlawed Baath party. It was unclear whether Sunni Arab tribal leaders responsible for the neighborhood security units would attend.

The Sadrists, the National List, the Accordance Front - these are not bit players and none believe this conference is anything more than PR spin. It remains to be seen whether the central government's ruling Shiites can convince the Ba'athists and any Sawhar attendees that they mean more than platitudes and hypocrisy while continuing to use the security forces as their personal instruments of power rather than for all Iraqis. I don't think either predominantly-Sunni group is that gullible. But without those three notable groups whole-hearted belief in central government good faith and their whole-hearted co-operation, the conference is already a washout anyway.

As Zakaria notes, it isn't the only reconciliation failure.

There has been some positive news reported in the past few weeks. On closer examination, it is more hype than reality. Two of the laws passed, one reversing de-Baathification and the other offering a limited amnesty to former insurgents, have been worded in such a way that much will depend on how they are implemented—by the Shiite government. The reason these assurances were written into law in binding terms was, of course, that Sunnis place so little trust in the good will and fairness of that government. When Baghdad promises to administer oil revenue wisely and fairly, though there is no law telling it precisely what to do, its claims are met with mistrust and unease by the Sunnis and the Kurds.

A Pentagon report to Congress last week admitted that "all four components of the hydrocarbon law are stalled." The law on provincial elections passed but was then vetoed by the presidency council, specifically by Shiite Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi, whose party now runs most of southern Iraq and does not wish to take its chances in new elections. And it's worth noting that the laws that passed did so only after months of intense wrangling, which produced an 82–82 tie that was broken by the Sunni speaker of Parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani. Finally, all these measures I've mentioned add up to only three or four of the 18 benchmarks set out by the Maliki government and the Bush administration to judge their own progress.

The end result of all this is to leave American troops stuck in a loop while a time-bomb of renewed violence ticks away factional patience with Maliki's government. And Bush is engaged in ensuring, via his promised Security Agreement, that should that time-bomb go off there still won't be an Iraqi future that does not require 'Coalition-in-the-loop.

And then there's the Republican heir-apparent, who has said he'd be just fine with another 100 years of US troops in Iraq. Alan Arkin wonders if he's any more able to face mistakes or unpleasant truths than Bush:

McCain? What does he recognize? It will be interesting to see if he comes back with anything new from Iraq or whether, like U.S. forces, he is stuck in a loop. After all, to admit that the political progress isn't keeping pace with the military progress is to admit that "we" have done as much as we can, that his ultimate position is flawed, and that we must withdraw just to give "the Iraqis" a chance.

Update Various worthies, including Matt and Kevin, are noting a massive McCain gaffe that we can only hope someone has on videotape:

He said several times that Iran, a predominately Shiite country, was supplying the mostly Sunni militant group, al-Qaeda. In fact, officials have said they believe Iran is helping Shiite extremists in Iraq.

Speaking to reporters in Amman, the Jordanian capital, McCain said he and two Senate colleagues traveling with him continue to be concerned about Iranian operatives "taking al-Qaeda into Iran, training them and sending them back."

....A few moments later, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, standing just behind McCain, stepped forward and whispered in the presidential candidate's ear. McCain then said: "I'm sorry, the Iranians are training extremists, not al-Qaeda."

As Kevin points out, even Lieberman's whispered version is simplistic - "What he should have said is that the Iranians are training many of the same extremists that we're allied with too. But that might have provoked a whole different set of questions that McCain would just as soon not answer." Such an elementary mistake, and one that shows that McCain is just as unimaginative and uninformed as the current Decider.

But doesn't Lieberman suit the role of Wormtongue?

SNAFU

By Cernig

I try not to use profanity on the blog too often, even though I'm a big fan of the f-word. As my countryman Billy Connelly says, it's very direct. No-one ever wrote in a book "'fuck off', he hinted." Profanity definitely has its place, especially in devastating snark, and I guess it's OK if quoted...

So over to John Cole.

The NY Times has nine op-eds to mark the 5th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq. Because I care about you all, I will simplify these op-eds into one sentence or less, each featuring the f-word. You will then be spared the pain of reading them.

Paul Bremer: “We fucked up, but it wasn’t my fault and I think Bush kinda fixed things last year.”

Richard Perle- “Things went great until those pussies at the State Department fucked up trying to fix what we bombed.”

Anne-Marie Slaugher: “This undertaking was fucked from the beginning.”

Kenneth M. Pollack- “If you think we are fucked right now, wait until you see what happens if we try to leave.”

Danielle Pletka- “The anti-war left was right about everything, but I still fucking hate them and will use this column to trash them.”

Nathaniel Flick- “Our fuck-ups can all be traced back to the fear we would be slimed.”

Major General Paul D. Eaton- “The sycophantic Republican Congress has fucked the military for a long time coming.”

Fred Kagan- “I love my fucking pompoms, and am currently applying for the job of Chief Assistant Fluffer for General Petraeus.”

Anthony Cordesman- “Bush/Cheney- Worst fucking administration EVAH.”

If you think I am exaggerating, read these for yourself.

See what I mean? All the punditry you need on nine whole op-eds. Well done, John.

(Hat tip - Kat again)

Point and click activism of the week

By Libby

I don't know how I get on these lists but Democrats.com, who bill themselves as the aggressive progressives, have a point and click petition you can sign that will be sent to your Congresslizards in the House and Senate on the side bar of this page, where you can also participate in an interesting fax-in asking them to bring the troops home.

I only sent a personalized message with the petition because I'm working through next Wednesday and don't have easy access to a fax and copier at the moment. If you do have time and access, I think the fax-in graphic idea sounds like great fun and a sure way to get their attention. In any event, signing the petition is a good two minute activism action for this week and a great way to commemorate the five year anniversary of this ill fated occupation.

Enlisting Opinions

By Cernig

Back in August 2007, seven enlisted men wrote an op-ed for the New York Times entitled "The War as We Saw It" which was highly critical of conduct of the Iraqi occupation up until that point and of the prospects for the "Surge" to initiate real reconciliation and reconstruction in Iraq. At the time, Michael Goldfarb of the Weekly Standard wrote that, as simple enlisted men and not generals, their "perspective is too limited for their opinions to have any value regarding the progress of the war." It was a view widely agreed to by the pro-occupation and pro-Surge right.

Yet today we have another op-ed, in the Washington Post by a sergeant - and this time conservatives want to listen because they say it is proof that the Surge is working, that "we have turned the corner and will succeed in this mission if we don’t quit on it first."

Double standard? I think so.

On the other hand, I linked to the op-ed by Sergeants Omar Mora, Yancy Gray and others by way of agreeing that their comments should be taken as a valuable part of the debate about Iraq and argued that their information had meaning. I can do no less for Sergeant Anthony Diaz today. He arrived in Iraq at about the time the first op-ed was being written, and so unlike those authors cannot compare current levels of violence to those of 2004-05, when similar levels were enough to cause the breakdown of Iraqi civil society. He writes that he is struck by "financial commitment we have made to reconstruction" without noting that the actual reconstruction return on those invested billions has been comparatively paltry. And he cites his own eyewitness account to show what he feels are "the inklings of representative government; and the small yet significant progress in communal relations between the mostly Shiite Iraqi army and the predominantly Sunni residents of this area.

Late last year, I witnessed something inspirational in a rather unlikely setting: an ordinary neighborhood advisory council meeting. Attendance was the highest I had yet seen, with about 40 prominent locals present. The coalition was represented by our squadron commander, a few colonels from the embedded provincial reconstruction team and a political officer from the U.S. Embassy. Discussions ranged from the persistent lack of electricity to sewage problems to economic development. What struck me were the comments of some Sunni workers from the district's power station, who came to complain that the (mostly Shiite) Iraqi army had mistreated them and accused them of distorting the distribution of electric power, something over which these workers have little control. The men said they would strike until they received better treatment and pleaded with the council chairman, a Sunni, for help. That was an unlikely outcome, given the entrenched animosity between Shiites and Sunnis and the lack of substantive political reconciliation even at the highest levels of government here. But these men did something many Americans would take for granted: They voiced grievances and sought assistance. These are the seeds of representative government, citizens coming forth and demanding change from their representatives. Much work remains to be done, but we have clearly made a start. [Emphasis mine - C]

I would argue that this anecdote shows precisely the opposite of Diaz' interpretation. The local Sunni council is undoubtedly controlled by local Sunni tribal leaders - this is no seed of representative government, just the workings as usual of tribal politics and the Sunni/Shiite divide which has become the governing factor of all Iraqi affairs.

Back in August last year, those seven other enlisted men wrote:

Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

They also wrote that "the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably" and specifically mentioned electricity services. I see nothing in Sgt Diaz' account to contradict them.

But let us turn to a general, as Goldfarb suggested back in August. General Petraeus told the Washington Post just the other day that:

"no one" in the U.S. and Iraqi governments "feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation," or in the provision of basic public services.

And, while admitting that ceasefires by Sunnis of the Awakening and Shiites of Sadr's Mahdi Army are greatly responsible for reduced violence (more than the US troop surge, I wonder?) he also admitted that:

some elements of both the Awakening movement and the Mahdi Army may be standing down in order to prepare for the day when the U.S. presence is diminished. "Some of them may be keeping their powder dry," Petraeus said of Mahdi Army members. "Obviously you would expect some of that to happen.

Which again accord with the opinions of those seven enlisted men from August last year. So no, not a "last corner" after all.

But as Petraeus says it, despite saying those enlisted men last August knew nothing beyond their own noses, conservative pundits who have heavily invested in both the Surge and its guiding general must offer up a startling about face. My colleague Eric Martin explains:

Now that Petraeus is saying it, those that were previously bashing war critics for making this exact point...will now act as if this was the case all along, that it was obvious, and only those naive war critics - who just don't "understand war" - have ignored this reality. Better still, this dynamic will be cited as the reason that we must continue the occupation for 100-Years-to-Infinity as John McCain promises repeatedly.

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can't leave can we - I mean, what about the oil (which was so totally not a reason for this invasion at all, in any way, whatsoever, I mean, who even knew Iraq had the second largest reserve oil supply in the world)? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can't leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Which is how they play their heads we win, tails you lose game to justify perpetual occupation.

I stick by my assessment that the US Surge is preordained to fail - that internal Iraqi dynamics dictate that as soon as the various factions have cause to fight instead of hold fire, they will do so and that none are invested in finding cause not to fight while the U.S. acts as buffer and protector to all. Which means that, eventually, there will be a fight in which the US can either take sides, be shot at by all sides or withdraw. Better to withdraw first.

Turkey Pulls Back Troops From Iraq

By Cernig

After saying no-one was going to dictate timetables to them, the Turks have gone ahead and pulled back their forces from Iraq, where they've been hunting Kurdish PKK terrorists.

A statement by Turkey's armed forces General Staff denied any foreign influence on the decision, which came a day after U.S President George W. Bush urged a swift end to the offensive.

"There was no question of completely liquidating the terrorist organisation, but Turkey has shown the organisation that northern Iraq is not a safe haven for them," the General Staff said.

Turkey sent thousands of soldiers into mountainous northern Iraq on February 21 to crush rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) who use the region as a base for attacks on Turkish territory.

"It was determined that the aims set at the start of the operation had been achieved," the General Staff said in its statement. "Our units returned to their bases (in Turkey) on the morning of February 29."

Announcing the withdrawal ahead of the General Staff, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari welcomed the decision to leave.

But Turkey's Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin, quoted by TV networks, said Ankara reserved the right to send troops again into Iraq if needed. A parliamentary mandate allowing the army to stage cross-border operations only expires in October.

The assumption is going to be that Bush and Gates managed to bend Turkey to their will - but I've a feeling it was far more about a hasty decision based on weather forecasts and reports of the Kurdish regional government mobilizing two brigades of peshmerga. And the General Staff statement is probably correct in at least this much - this was always a reconnaisance in force as preparation for a far larger Spring offensive. This one isn't over yet.

Obama On Mercenaries In Iraq

By Cernig

I now have a new reason to be troubled by Obama's policy platform (See, I told you I wasn't simply his cheerleader): it looks very like any troop drawdown he ordered in Iraq would simply be replaced by a surge of mercanaries from Blackwater and others.

A senior foreign policy adviser to leading Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has told The Nation that if elected Obama will not "rule out" using private security companies like Blackwater Worldwide in Iraq. The adviser also said that Obama does not plan to sign on to legislation that seeks to ban the use of these forces in US war zones by January 2009, when a new President will be sworn in. Obama's campaign says that instead he will focus on bringing accountability to these forces while increasing funding for the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the agency that employs Blackwater and other private security contractors. (Hillary Clinton's staff did not respond to repeated requests for an interview or a statement on this issue.)

Obama's broader Iraq withdrawal plan provides for some US troops to remain in Iraq--how many his advisers won't say. But it's clear that Obama's "follow-on force" will include a robust security force to protect US personnel in Iraq, US trainers (who would also require security) for Iraqi forces and military units to "strike at Al Qaeda"--all very broad swaths of the occupation.

"If Barack Obama comes into office next January and our diplomatic security service is in the state it's in and the situation on the ground in Iraq is in the state it's in, I think we will be forced to rely on a host of security measures," said the senior adviser. "I can't rule out, I won't rule out, private security contractors." He added, "I will rule out private security contractors that are not accountable to US law."

I'm just not sure that's good enough. Maybe if they were accountable to Iraqi law then such a quibble would have some teeth...but even so I'm inclined to think foreign mercenary armies in a situation such as that in Iraq are just a bad thing, period.

I also note that Clinton's silent on this one so far. I'd like to know, personally.

Grumpy Awakening

By Cernig

The WaPo reports that Sunni members of the Awakening in Iraq are losing patience with the Iraqi government and US occupation in increasing numbers.

Since Feb. 8, thousands of fighters in restive Diyala province have left their posts in order to pressure the government and its American backers to replace the province's Shiite police chief. On Wednesday, their leaders warned that they would disband completely if their demands were not met. In Babil province, south of Baghdad, fighters have refused to man their checkpoints after U.S. soldiers killed several comrades in mid-February in circumstances that remain in dispute.

Some force leaders and ground commanders also reject a U.S.-initiated plan that they say offers too few Sunni fighters the opportunity to join Iraq's army and police, and warn that low salaries and late payments are pushing experienced members to quit.

...U.S. efforts to manage this fast-growing movement of about 80,000 armed men are still largely effective, but in some key areas the control is fraying. The tensions are the most serious since the Awakening was launched in Anbar province in late 2006, according to Iraqi officials, U.S. commanders and 20 Awakening leaders across Iraq. Some U.S. military officials say they are growing concerned that the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq has infiltrated Awakening forces in some areas.

"Now, there is no cooperation with the Americans," said Haider Mustafa al-Kaisy, an Awakening commander in Baqubah, the capital of Diyala province, an insurgent stronghold that U.S. and Iraqi forces are still struggling to control. "We have stopped fighting al-Qaeda."

..."They should make me stronger. They should not weaken me," said Kassim, a former commander in the Islamic Army, an insurgent group. "We need weapons. We need vehicles. We do not even have gas for the few cars we have. When we joined, the Americans promised to provide all necessities. Now we know those were only words."

In the past two months, he said, 20 of his fighters have quit. Many felt their monthly salary was no longer worth the risk of fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. His men also have not received their salaries in two months, he said. "We'll all be patient for another two months. If nothing changes, then we'll suspend and quit," Kassim said. "Then we'll go back to fighting the Americans."

It's not as if this kind of talk was unexpected. DoD and military types from Gates on down have been warning that the window of opportunity the Awakening opened was a temporary one that needed to be taken advantage of. Yet the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government dragged its feet, probably fearful of arming too many Sunnis who could still turn their guns on their fellow Iraqis. Despite the military's warnings, it must be said, the Bush administration hasn't exactly hold the Iraqi government's feet to the fire over this either. Lots of talk, but no carrots and no sticks. I think that comes from their being no effective domestic pressure on the White House to do so - it's supporters, the only people it appears to listen to, were too busy cheering "victory' at last.

However, there's still, by the looks of things, time to get those carrots and sticks out. Maybe the White House will now have an incentive to do so. Although arming the Awakening comprises a potential long-term problem, by creating yet another armed group with no loyalty to the central government and a governing ideology that appears to see itself as the natural ruler of Sunni regions, in the short term it's one of the things keeping violence down in Iraq to admittedly horrible 2005 levels.

I suppose the theory is to put a bandage on the currently bleeding wound and hope to treat the body's cancer once the bleeding stops. But unfortunately the US occupation, as a paramedic, is like Edward Scissorhands. Putting a bandage on one wound seems to keep opening others. Maybe it would be better for Dr. Scissorhands to leave the patient to self-administer first aid. It would certainly seem to be the right time to try to arrange for another set of medics, rather than extending the US presence with Bush's agreement that won't be a treaty.

Should We Stay Or Should We Go?

By Cernig

Should I stay or should I go now?
If I go there will be trouble
And if I stay it will be double
So you gotta let me know
Should I stay or should I go? - The Clash.

Dave Schuler does a good job of deconstructing the holes in the withdrawal argument put forward by John Podesta, Ray Takeyh and Lawrence J. Korb today. But then again, Andy Sullivan has a hard look at Cordesman and does the same for the argument to stay.

In Dave's comments, Andy the Nonpartisanpundit writes that “The calls for withdrawal are more based on domestic considerations than actual US foreign policy interests,” but isn’t it always the case that US foreign policy is domestic policy inflicted on foreigners? The George Friedman article he cites certainly says so - that the policy is usually independent of the facts but that the facts determine the success or failure of the policy.

For me, it's about the long-term truth on the ground. I’m personally for withdrawal because I don’t believe the US can help accomplish or drive forward the massive to-do list that’s still outstanding even if violence is back to 2005 levels. Even by holding the violence down indefinitely. At some point, US foreign policy has to realise that over time Iraq’s self-determination will largely continue as Iraqis decide - perhaps even by fighting it out - and not to the tune of US policy or national interests. It's not a case of "political progress isn't fast enough" - it's that political progress of the kind Iraqis want but which will not be in U.S. interests is eventually inevitable. Iraq will be a sovereign nation, maybe even three sovereign nations, and even the UK (America's oldest ally) does stuff the U.S. would try to prevent if it had a permanent occupation there. Trying to hold back the tide is a mistake Canute learned the hard way and the British Empire learned the even harder way.

Mullen Says Army "Significantly Stressed"

By Cernig

Admiral Mullen, the US' top man in uniform, has told Congress that the Army is "significantly stressed" by deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan:

"The pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from fully training for the full spectrum of operations and impacts our ability to be ready to counter future threats," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony prepared for delivery Wednesday.

..."I am extremely concerned about the toll the current pace of operations is taking on them and on their families, on our equipment and on our ability to respond to crises and contingencies beyond ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan," he said.

Mullen also said violence in Iraq has "substantially decreased," but that Afghanistan is facing "a growing insurgency, increasing violence and a burgeoning drug trade fueled by widespread poppy cultivation."

The real heart of the fight against Al Qaeda and it's satellite groups - the Afghan/Pakistan front - is in crisis while the Army's ability to respond to new threats has been severely limited because it is being drained by Bush's war of choice. Which is what those who favor withdrawal from Iraq have been saying - to rightwing cries of "defeatists!" - for some time now. Is Mullen one of those "phony troops"?

Meanwhile, SecDef Bob Gates can't even begin to guess roughly how many troops will still be committed to iraq in six months or a years time, despite the drop in violence. I wonder if he thinks, as many do, that the Surge's success will be temporary without radical positive action on reconcilliation? It would certainly appear so.

(But honestly, Mr. Gates, describing the Dept. of Defense as "the world's biggest supertanker" isn't going to help the administration's contention that Iraq wasn't all about oil and oil money. You've got a dark sense of humour there.)

Supporting The Troops Not The War

By Cernig

Can you support the troops if you don't support the war? The troops themselves weigh in, with their wallets:

Individuals in the Army, Navy and Air Force made those branches of the armed services among the top contributors in the 4th Quarter, ranking No. 13, No. 18 and No. 21, respectively. In 2007, Republican Ron Paul, who opposes U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, was the top recipient of money from donors in the military, collecting at least $212,000 from them. Barack Obama, another war opponent, was second with about $94,000.

(H/t Think Progress)

My good friend Kyle Moore, who is himself an ex-serviceman, adds:

That’s a pretty sizeable sum, especially when you stop to consider that these folks aren’t exactly the richest in the world (I know this from first hand. It’s a good salary, just not a stellar one).

So, if all the hawks are saying that you have to support the war to support the troops, I think the message returned from the troops is “No thanks.”

can so many soldiers really be phonies? Will someone ask Rush Limbaugh?

Iraq Forever With A Broken Army?

By Cernig

The NY Times notes that Bush is preparing the way for halting troop withdrawals from Iraq at the 20,000 combat troops already announced. Which would leave more US troops in Iraq post-Surge than there were before it, and leave them there for the forseeable future.

Four months after announcing troop reductions in Iraq, President Bush is now sending signals that the cuts may not continue past this summer, a development likely to infuriate Democrats and renew concerns among military planners about strains on the force.

Mr. Bush has made no decisions on troop reductions to follow those he announced last September. But White House officials said Mr. Bush had been taking the opportunity, as he did in Monday’s State of the Union address, to prepare Americans for the possibility that, when he leaves office a year from now, the military presence in Iraq will be just as large as it was a year ago, or even slightly larger.

As Libby already noted today, Dubya issued a signing statement saying he would ignore parts of the recent defense bill applying to permanent bases in Iraq too. Andrew Sullivan notes the same development and writes:

Bush is doing all he can to make the occupation of Iraq a permanent feature of global politics for the rest of our lives. It's his legacy and he's determined to make it the next president's as well.

That certainly seems to be the case - and John Mccain, the Republican candidate barring immense ill-fortune on his part - seems to be just fine with the plan.

"But Capt'n, the Army canna tak' it."

Within the Pentagon, senior officers have struggled to balance the demands of the Iraq war against the competing demands to recruit, train and retain a robust and growing ground force. That institutional tension is personified by two of Mr. Bush’s top generals, David H. Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, and George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff. General Petraeus’s mission is to win the war; General Casey must also worry about the health of the whole Army.

...What a continuing commitment of 15 brigades — more than 130,000 troops — would mean for the Army as a whole is said to be a major concern of General Casey, among others on the joint staff.

Fester's our resident wonk on army numbers and sustainability so hopefully he'll update with his opinions later, but in the absence of new dilithium crystals, I don't see how the Pentagon can deliver. It looks to me very like Republican plans will break the US Army - so much for being strong on national security.

African Command Can't Find African Home

By Cernig

The US military's African command cannot find an African nation willing to host it, and will stay in Germany for the forseeable future. This story is flying under everyone's radar and yet I think it's one of the most clearcut examples yet of the damage the Bush presidency has done to America on the world stage.

A year after President George W. Bush approved its creation, the new U.S. military command for Africa is finding its feet but has quietly dropped talk of basing itself on the African continent.

Largely carved out of U.S. European Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, the new Africa Command (Africom) will stay there for now as its leaders try to switch the debate away from the controversial headquarters issue and on to the "added value" it aims to bring to Africa.

"In the near to mid-term, and for the foreseeable future, we're going to be here and from here we can do all the activities that we need to do with our African partners," Africom's deputy commander, Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, said in an interview on Monday in Stuttgart.

Where U.S. officials once spoke confidently of plans to base the command in Africa, shared between several countries, they now stress the multiple conditions that would need to be fulfilled.

"If it's in the desire and the interests of our African partners in that regard then we'll look for an opportunity to do that where it makes sense to do so, but only obviously where we're invited," Moeller said.

The caution stems from the unwelcoming reaction of several African nations, including regional powers South Africa and Nigeria, to the notion of Africom setting up on their patch.

Africom found itself having to justify its ambitious mission -- in Bush's words, to promote peace, security and "our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa" -- in the face of widespread opposition and scepticism.

Critics have suggested its real motives are thirst for oil -- West African producers are expected to supply a quarter of U.S. consumption by 2015 -- and the desire to counter growing Chinese influence on the continent.

African nations have more reason than most to be sceptical of major powers' intentions, to be sure, but what does it say that they're more afraid of American hegemony than of the terrorist menace?

Kucinich Out

By Cernig

Kucinich has signalled that he's out of the nomination race, according to reports.

Democratic presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich is abandoning his second bid for the White House. In an interview with Cleveland's Plain Dealer, the six-term congressman said he was quitting the race and would make a formal announcement on Friday.

"I will be announcing that I'm transiting out of the presidential campaign," Kucinich said. "I'm making that announcement tomorrow about a new direction."

This swan-dive into the candidate death-pool wasn't exactly unforseen but i still think it's a pity he didn't get more support. We're left with a field that's far more to the hawkish Right than I'm comfortable with. Kucinich said he will not endorse another Democrat in the primary.

A Friedman Unit for the Surge Sceptics

By Cernig

Claims by the US military that 75% of Baghdad’s neighborhoods are now secure, up from 8% a year ago, have the usual triumphalists all in a lather today.

The military classifies 356 of Baghdad's 474 neighborhoods in the "control" or "retain" category of its four-tier security rating system, meaning enemy activity in those areas has been mostly eliminated and normal economic activity is resuming.

...The 310 neighborhoods in the "control" category are secure, but depend on U.S. and Iraqi military forces to maintain the peace. The 46 areas in the "retain" category have reached a level where Iraqi police and security forces can maintain order, a more permanent fix. The remaining areas have fewer security forces based there, though they are not necessarily violent.

In February 2007, when additional U.S. forces began arriving, only 37 Baghdad neighborhoods were in the "control" and "retain" categories.

No mention, you note, of the roles sectarian cleansing and massive enclosure walls might have played in making the city into a series of quieter villages. Notice too that we have to take the military's word - their classification - on this. Who is going to go out unescorted and check to see if the areas they say are controlled are as controlled as they say they are?

But those quibbles aside what comes through strongly is that, as in all things, the Iraqi government still can't stand up on its own. As James Joyner notes as he runs down the lack of reconcilliation and reconstruction measures, many of which were due to be completed by now:

It goes too far, though, to say that this demonstrates that the Surge worked. The goal was to alleviate the worst of the violence — which has happened — so as to provide breathing room for political reconciliation. That has not been achieved.

And there's a possible spoiler in the offing - regular newshoggers researcher Kat emails to say Muqtada al-Sadr may not extend his ceasefire.

Radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr put the United States and the Iraqi government on notice Friday that he may not extend a six-month cease-fire by his militia.

The cease-fire by the Mahdi Army militia, due to expire next month, has been cited by U.S. commanders in Iraq as a major contributor to the nationwide reduction of violence over the past six months. U.S. and Iraqi forces, however, have stepped up their hunt for the militiamen in recent months, arguing they were members of rogue cells closely linked to Iran.

"The rationale for the decision to extend the freeze of the Mahdi Army is beginning to wear thin," Salah al-Obeidi, al al-Sadr spokesman, said in a statement issued in the holy city of Najaf south of Baghdad.

"This is because the government is supporting some criminal gangs operating inside security agencies and which refuse to abide by the law," said al-Obeidi. He did not elaborate, but he was alluding to Shiites from rival groups that have infiltrated security forces.

Al-Obeidi said senior security officials remained in their jobs despite arrest warrants issued against them for human rights abuses. "This will force us to reconsider the decision to extend the cease-fire despite repeated public statements in the past that we will."

"This statement should be taken as a warning to the Iraqi government to pay heed ... if it wants to bolster stability," said the statement.

Ouch. Even Mookie isn't happy with the pace of Maliki's reforms - or rather with the utter lack of even trying on anything that might harm Maliki's power base.

If Sadr doesn't extend his ceasefire - which even US officials acknowledge has been a major cause of the security successes the Surgers like to claim as belonging entirely to Saint Petraeus - then I guess we'll find out pretty quickly if the good guys really own the streets of Baghdad or whether they were only loaned them for a while. If he does extend, then that too will prove something - that Sadr sees more potential gain from politics than armed conflict - which will be an important marker in Iraq's post-invasion history.

There are other factors at play too. This year we're going to find out if the various Awakening groups who have now taken on local leadership in their areas actually want to play peaceful politics or whether, as some suspect, they're warlord-led bands ready to jump the rails as soon as the prospect of loot and some score-evening comes along. If the former, then reconcilliation of sorts from the ground up is possible. If the latter, then ground-up reconcilliation based on the Awakening is a pipe dream and the US will have armed (or paid for the arms, same thing) of multiple sides in a faction war.

I say give it a Friedman Unit - six months. After all, the pro-occupation crowd demanded and got enough of them. Let's wait and see if, in six months, Iraq and Baghdad are still seeing the same or lower levels of violence; levels roughly comparable to early 2004 at which point I still thought Iraq was salvageable even if it was the wrong war for the wrong reasons. If after a Friedman Unit things still look as relatively quiet, I'll admit that the Surge (along with the entirely independent Awakenining and Sadr's ceasefire), contributed to making Iraq potentially viable again.

De-Baathification Passes (Updated)

By Cernig

At last, the measure that many on the Left had always said was crucially important if Iraq was to reclaim long-term stability - undoing the Bush administration's incredibly stupid decision to ban any and all who had been Ba'ath Party members from holding posts in government - has passed unanimously in the Iraqi parliament, albeit with a slim majority of possible votes. Although everyone present voted for the bill, only 143 lawmakers out of 275 turned up.

This is, without a doubt, good news for Iraqis despite those who boycotted the vote - among them some hardline Sunnis. As John Cole writes today:

To date, all of the mindless cheerleading from the usual suspects about the success of the surge has been utterly meaningless, as there have been no acts of political reconciliation, the stated goal of the surge. This might be the start of that reconciliation, and may start everyone down the path towards long-term sustainable peace. We can hope.

And Captain Ed nails it too:

This allows Sunnis to retake their jobs and join the Shi'ites and Kurds in administering government functions, especially in Sunni areas. It gives them a stake in the new, representative government instead of being shut out of it. Sunnis will now have every reason to support the central government in Baghdad rather than attempting to undermine it to get back what they lost in the fall of Saddam, and they won't need to again adopt the fascist Ba'ath principles to do so.

This looks like progress to me.

Great. Spot on. Then Ed fails at the next jump.

It's progress that wouldn't have come without lowering the violence and removing the provocations and depredations of al-Qaeda in Iraq. That wouldn't have happened at all had we not ramped up our efforts and taken a much more aggressive posture against the terrorists -- and the Sunnis would not have cooperated if we hadn't signaled so strongly that we intended to beat AQI and stick it out.

Uh...no.

It's progress that wouldn't have come if the Sunnis of Anbar hadn't turned on AQI independently of and prior to the Surge, deciding that whatever else was happening AQ was bad for them. It's progress that wouldn't have come if the Awakening hadn't put together a cohesive 70,000 member militia army which could, should it wish to, create a de facto seperate state out of the Sunni heartlands and make anything the Green Zone's gravy train said or did redundant. The credit for ousting AQ and successfully pressuring the cental government goes entirely to the Anbaris and their Sunni sahwar friends in other areas. The most the Surge's commanders can truthfully claim is spotting what was going on then getting behind it and pushing with lots of money and guns. It's highly debatable whether any troops were actually needed at all.

And as always in Iraq, the story is more complicated than it first appears. If the occupation authorities hadn't first blocked the ba'athists and if central government Shiites hadn't tried so hard to give Sunnis no local voice whatsoever - then they wouldn't be faced with the prospect of a 70,000 member army led by local warlords who are not, at present, beholden to the central government in any way whatsoever and over whom they have very little leverage. That's going to be the next big problem (well, that and Mookie - his ceasefire is due to end in March). There are still other reconcilliation legislations held up in Green Zone politicking too. While this is a very positive step, Iraq isn't out of the woods yet.

Update It seems I may have been too quick to swallow the initial version of this news. In comments to this post, Dubhaltach of Gorrilas Guides - a combined English and Arabic site on Iraqi happenings - writes that all is not as rosy as it has been pained. For a start, the measure only passed by a majority of a quorum and it still has to be ratified by the presidential council (the president and both VP's) which he thinks may be problemmatic. He also notes that the main ba'athist website opposes the measure as it requires registration of former party members - and someone has been killing of former army officers. The implication is that registration will make that easier. The Sadrist site Nahrainet called it a "Black day in the history of Irak" and the National Dialogue Front said it was "unworkable".

Also, via Kevin Drum, comes a report in the WaPo which quotes Ali al-Lami, spokesman for the current de-Baathification commission, saying that the law will make it easier to get rid of even more Sunnis:

The new measure could lead to a new purge of members of the current Iraqi government, Lami said, including about 7,000 officers in the Interior Ministry. Even influential Iraqi security force officials who used to be Baathists could face removal.

"The commander of the Baghdad security plan and his assistants, according to the new law, they should retire," he said.

The NY Times is also hedging its bets some. Dubhaltach writes "progress my foot." My colleague Libby says "This appears to be more a parliamentary parlor trick designed to play to the US audience than it is a real breakthrough in placating the displaced Baathists. In fact, the Baathists lose more than they gain with this new legislation." This is a squandered opportunity. Ah well.

It remains true, however, that we "Lefty defeatists" have been saying since word one that de-ba'athification was a bad idea and that legislation which would properly repeal it and give former ba'ath party members a chance to return to government without persecution is an essential ingredient in making Iraq a viable state. Of course, now that the US Right have embraced our ideas, we don't get any credit for having them first.

Obama Could Force GOP To Defend War Policies

By Cernig

I see Michael O'Hanlon, the war hawk who likes to pretend he isn't, is having a go at Obama in today's Wall Street Journal because Obama won't respect his authoritay!

Matt has a good point when he says that Obama's diserspect for the VSP's who got so very much utterly wrong is a feature rather than a bug. He adds:

From the standpoint of foreign policy doctrine, this has been a frustrating primary to watch. The candidates have debated the main issues of domestic policy at a high level of detail, despite (or perhaps because of) everyone agreeing that they share the same basic approach. On national security issues, it's always been far less obvious how big or small the disgareements really are. And yet, few broad issues have really been mooted and everyone's quite vague. Instead of hearing thing straightforwardly, we're left in the position of trying to assess the contenders' likely conduct by judging the shadows. But this shadow definitely points in Obama's favor.

It's true that the race has been about personalities rather than policies - so far. But Captain Ed notes that the GOP are worried enough about Obama to be circulating emails pointing to O'Hanlon's op-ed to the usual talking heads. he goes on to spout the party line that "the country is at war" blah blah and "needs experience" blah blah. (Like Bush had any foreign policy experience.) Yet the GOP frontrunners own policies and experience all point to them being Bush clones - with Bush policies on Iraq permanent basing, crappy diplomacy, sabre rattling against Iran and ignoring the elephant in the room that is Pakistan.

In other words, while everyone has been saying that the coming election won't be about the War on Brown People Terror and Mission: Iraqi Occupation Forever... Obama as the Dem nominee might force the GOP to make that exactly what the election is all about. In all its dirty and inglorious detail and with room aplenty to put bigoted and warmongering Republican feet in mouths. Which is fine by me.

Iraq - Let's Review

By Cernig

I can't be the only one who is hearfelt sick of wingnut crowing that, because violence is dramatically down in Iraq, they have won the war with liberal "Defeatocrats" as well as the war with Al Qaeda, all from the safety of their Cheeto-strewn beanbag chairs.

So let's review, shall we?

Liberals told them extreme de-ba'athification and disbanding the Iraqi army immediately post invasion was a bad idea and would move hordes of trained and armed manpower from security forces to insurgency overnight. They didn't listen. Had they done so, the Anbar Awakening could have happened before Al Qaeda got off the ground and as an organised part of the government's monopoly on force rather than as competition to that monopoly.

We told them, as long ago as 2005, that the earlier the insurgency was separated into AQ and nationalist elements, and negotiations began with the nationalists to bring them into the fold, the better. We were told that there was no such thing as a nationalist insurgency and that "you don't negotiate with terrorists". Yet today the bulk of the leadership of the various local Sahwa (Awakening) groups are former insurgents from one group or another.

We told them that bringing in poltical cronies and handing them the power to run Iraq - especially since many of those cronies were more beholden to iran than America, no matter what they said at the time - was a bad idea. We told them holding elections in which only those out-of-exile cronies would win seats was a bad idea. We told them that allowing those cronies to soft-pedal on those parts of the Iraqi constitution that were most relevant to Shiite/Sunni reconcilliation was a bad idea. We told them that if they did that, they'd still be waiting for their cronies to actually act on their promises to review those parts of the constitution a year and more later. We told them that all this would make reconcilliation impossible as long as the cronies held U.S.-backed office. We were correct on it all and we were ignored on it all.

In 2005 we also pointed to Col. McMaster's success in Tal Afar and to the small group of maverick officers who were being sidelined because they were saying the Bush administration's counter-insurgency strategy was wrongheaded and counter-productive. We were ignored for another two years, as things got worse and thousands died.

The debacle following the bombings of Samarra redefined the scale of violence to such an extent that, even now, the fall in violence from that high is only back to levels that destroyed Iraqi society in the first place. Even the members of the War party realised that Iraq was a disaster of monumental proportions - although they blamed their cronies rather than themselves. Some threatened to revolt until the Bush administration and its neocon enablers found a pet general willing to nod as they passed those good ideas they had previously ignored off as their own work.

In the two years between liberals saying these things and the extreme Right deciding to pass them off as their own fresh, new ideas a couple of thousand US servicemen and women died, thousands were wounded. Many more Iraqis died or were wounded while more than 4 million became exiled from their own homes. If the Right had listened to liberals in the first place, there would have been a real Iraqi security force, integrated and in accord with the people...and Samarra wouldn't have happened.

Even now, with the U.S. military forced to admit (after pointed questions from liberals) that the Sahwas and Sadr's ceasefire constitute the bulk of the reasons for a quieter Iraq, the pro-war crowd try to ascribe the credit for those things to a Surge which was entirely taken by surprise by both of them. Meanwhile, we anti-occupation types were predicting that both were possible back in 2005. How many died becuase the Bush administration was slow to listen?

So now we've come to a situation where most of those ideas put forward by anti-occupation commentators back in 2005 have been belatedly implemented - and things have improved, as we always said they would. However, instead of a co-ordinated and national Sawha, we have balkanisation all the way down to the level of local neighbourhoods. As one member of a "concerned citizens" group in Baghdad told the Guardian - "We learned we could not trust anyone who is not from our neighbourhood." The cronies are still useless - that same Guradian report, which is being linked to by pro-war pundits approvingly today as a sign of successes, quotes an obviously American anonymous diplomat:

"They are filling a void left by Iraq's feuding and self-serving political elite, most of whom are hunkered down and out of touch in the Green Zone,"

Indeed, the Bush administration's cronies are stalling the Sawha movement as much as possible. So much so that 80% of them will go to civil works projects, with American pay, rather than stay as part of Iraq's security forces. It's worth noting that another thing libverals said way back when was that the idle and dissafected youth of Iraq must be given jobs - that it would be cheaper to pay them for make-work than to pay to fight them as insurgents. We were correct, again.

But how quickly the Right forgets. Another thing we told them was that they shouldn't be so quick to enable militias such as the Badr Brigade or to incorportate them into Iraq's security forces en masse, for then they would have divided loyalties and undermine the government's monopoly on military force which is an integral part of peaceful and civilised society.

The worry now for those who have always opposed both the invasion of Iraq and the debacle the Bush administration made of the occupation, is that the US is still seen as the divider, not the uniter - by both sides. The various Iraqi factions will continue to clash - they must, by their own internal dynamics. When they do, no matter which side the U.S. military aids it will be seen as the enemy by the other. It's a no-win situation which is only made worse by the fact that every Iraqi faction already sees the U.S. military as a fairweather ally at best and the original source of all their troubles at worst. The best way out is to remove the primary causus belli - American protection and the battle between the factions to gain and keep it. In other words, a complete withdrawal to leave Iraq a true sovereign state.

Yet again, the Right aren't listening, being too busy crowing about "their" win in the face of all the evidence that it was, in fact, liberal ideas which have succeeded where their's failed.

Is it any wonder we don't want to join their victory celebrations?

update The BBC's Jim Muir in Baghdad has a sobering thought for the victory-criers:

One of the main stated objectives of the US troop surge was to clear a space for the Iraqi politicians to enact nation-building legislation and pursue national reconciliation as the cornerstone of the New Iraq.

But virtually none of the key pieces of required legislation has yet been passed by a fractious Iraqi parliament which has been wracked by factional disputes.

There is still no shared and agreed vision of Iraq's future. Kurds and some Shias want a loose, federal arrangement, while Sunnis and some others want a stronger, more centralised state.

It matters. To which Iraq are people signing up with the security forces swearing allegiance?

To which I can only, pessimistically, add: and what will they do if they find they aren't getting the Iraq they want?

Cronkite - Bring The Troops Home

By Cernig

I'm astounded this one hasn't gotten more traction as yet, given Cronkite's pivotal role in ending the Vietnam War. America's Anchorman released a statement on Tuesday along with David Krieger from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. They say it is time to end the occupation of Iraq and bring the troops home.

We must ask ourselves whether continuing to pursue this war is benefiting the American people or weakening us. We must ask whether continuing the war is benefiting the Iraqi people or inflicting greater suffering upon them. We believe the answer to these inquiries is that both the American and Iraqi people would benefit by ending the US military presence in Iraq.

Moving forward is not complicated, but it will require courage. Step one is to proceed with the rapid withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and hand over the responsibility for the security of Iraq to Iraqi forces. Step two is to remove our military bases from Iraq and to turn Iraqi oil over to Iraqis. Step three is to provide resources to the Iraqis to rebuild the infrastructure that has been destroyed in the war.

Congress must act. Although Congress never declared war, as required by the Constitution, they did give the president the authority to invade Iraq. Congress must now withdraw that authority and cease its funding of the war.

It is not likely, however, that Congress will act unless the American people make their voices heard with unmistakable clarity. That is the way the Vietnam War was brought to an end. It is the way that the Iraq War will also be brought to an end. The only question is whether it will be now, or whether the war will drag on, with all the suffering that implies, to an even more tragic, costly and degrading defeat. We will be a better, stronger and more decent country to bring the troops home now.

(Hat Tip - Firedoglake)

The Last Mandate For Iraq (Updated)

By Cernig

Updated below

Shiite politicians are making it clear they have set a timetable for withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq. At a joint news conference with SCIRI (Badr Brigade) leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi was clear that the next extension of the UN mandate will be the last.

The Shiite vice president, meanwhile, said the government will link discussions on the next extension of the U.N. mandate of the U.S.-led multinational force to an agreement that Iraq will gain full sovereignty and "full control over all of its resources and issues."

He also demanded an "equal footing" with the U.S. on security issues as a sovereign country so Iraqi could "have relations with other states with sovereignty and interests."

He said the government would announce within days a "declaration of intent" that would not involve military bases but would raise "issues on organizing the presence of the multinational forces and ending their presence on Iraqi land."

Iraqi officials have said the extension of the mandate through the end of 2008 will be the last.

KUNA has more, reporting that the Shiite VP said:

such a declaration would envision an agreement that could set a schedule for the presence of multinational forces on Iraq's soil.

He added that the Iraqi government would extend the mandate of multinational forces in Iraq at the advent of next month, making it clear that this "would be the final extension that would be followed by an agreement that could restore Iraq's full sovereignty." The Iraqi vice president reiterated support for putting a federal system in place and enacting a law of regions.

"The federal system is neither a luxurious matter nor an ideological stance. Rather, it is a fact and a constitutional demand that should be put in place. The Iraqi people voted for that, and the parliament adopted a draft law on the formation of regions. We have a few months ahead to arrive at a final formula," Abdel-Mahdi said.

The only argument he's likely to get from Sunnis and the more nationalist Sadrists (Mahdi Army) on withdrawal will be on whether the current mandate, which expires in December, should be the last instead. So, at latest, 2008 is when the occupation ends. Basing agreements might yet be reached for post December 2008 but that's a very different kettle of fish from having responsibility for the rule of law and thus permission to conduct widespread operations.

Federalism, that's a different story. The Sunnis have a legitimate beef that their oft-promised and never delivered constitutional amendments ("wait until after the elections. It'll be OK, we promise") should have something to say about that.

But, oddly enough, I was looking in the Newshoggers archives for another post yesterday and came across this from December 2004.

According to The Scotsman newspaper, senior military sources in the British Army have said they have been told that the entire British contingent will be staying for 2 years with around 7,000 soldiers, a brigade-sized force, staying until late 2008.

...You can bet your bottom euro (or dollar if you want a cheaper bet) that if the British Army will be in Iraq until 2008, there is no realistic chance of getting U.S. troops out any sooner than that - and it will probably be later. President Bush will preside over a full four year term with an Iraq War in progress, come what may.

This was written at a time, mind you, when pro-occupation rightwing cheerleaders had been talking up about the chances of being able to pull the bulk of the US troop presence out of Iraq after the January 2005 election.

The British military, and thus obviously the US military too, knew as long ago as December 2004 they would be committed in force until December 2008. Is it possible that Shiite leaders knew it too and that a deal had been done, with those Shiite leaders now saying what they knew to be agreed all along? Has every word about possible substantial withdrawals ("we will stand down as they stand up") since then been simple kabuki?

Update As soon as I posted this, AP put out a report quoting two anonymous senior iraqi officials on the probable future of the US troop presence in Iraq.

Iraq's government is prepared to offer the U.S. a long-term troop presence in Iraq and preferential treatment for American investments in return for an American guarantee of long-term security including defense against internal coups...

...The two senior Iraqi officials said Iraqi authorities had discussed the broad outlines of the proposal with U.S. military and diplomatic representatives. The Americans appeared generally favorable subject to negotiations on the details.

The two Iraqi officials, who are from two different political parties, spoke on condition of anonymity because the subject is sensitive. Members of parliament were briefed on the plan during a three-hour closed-door meeting Sunday, during which lawmakers loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr objected to the formula. [Duh! - C]

U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Mirembe Nantongo noted that Iraqi officials had expressed a desire for a strategic partnership with the U.S. in a political declaration last August and an end to the U.N.-mandated force.

"Thereafter then the question becomes one of bilateral relationships between Iraq and the countries of the multinational forces," she said. "At that point we need to be considering long-term bilateral relationships and we're following the Iraqi thinking on this one and we agree with their thinking on this and we'll be looking at setting up a long-term partnership with different aspects to it, political, economic, security and so forth."

She said any detailed discussion of bases and investment preferences was "way, way, way ahead of where we are at the moment."

The Iraqi officials said that under the proposed formula, Iraq would get full responsibility for internal security and American troops would relocate to bases outside the cities. Iraqi officials foresee a long-term presence of about 50,000 U.S. troops, down from the current figure of over 160,000.

That magic number of 50,000 troops. How many US politicians have already mentioned it over the past few years? It's useless as a COIN force (and any authority for such would have to stem from the Iraqi government) but serves as a tripwire to stop Kuwait (or Turkey or Iran) invading - or all those Sunnis armed by the Awakening mounting a new coup, which won't please said Sunni militias.

How will the neighbours feel?

One official said the Iraqis expect objections from Iraq's neighbors. Iran and Syria will object because they oppose a U.S. presence in the region.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia will not like the idea of any reduction in their roles as Washington's most important Arab partners.

Or, most likely, another Shia-controlled nation, this time with long-term US protection, on their doorsteps.

Update 2 Well, the leaks and statements I mentioned above were obviously co-ordinated to set the scene for today's announcement by Bush and Maliki of a joint statement of "principles" for a permanent US presence in Iraq. Spencer Ackerman writes:

"democratic Iraq" here means the Shiite-led Iraqi government. The current political arrangement will receive U.S. military protection against coups or any other internal subversion. That's something the Iraqi government wants desperately: not only is it massively unpopular, even among Iraqi Shiites, but the increasing U.S.-Sunni security cooperation strikes the Shiite government -- with some justification -- as a recipe for a future coup.

Notice also the timetable. The U.S. and Iraq will negotiate another year-long United Nations mandate for foreign troops in Iraq, which will expire (I think) in late December 2008. According to today's declaration, following the forthcoming renewal at the U.N., "we will begin negotiation of a framework that will govern the future of our bilateral relationship." That means that during Bush's last year in office, the administration will work out the terms of the U.S.'s stay in Iraq in order to, at the very least, seriously constrain the next administration's options for ending the U.S. presence. Even if Bush doesn't take the audacious step of signing a so-called Status of Forces Agreement -- the basic document for garrisoning U.S. forces on foreign soil -- while he's a lame duck, the simple fact of negotiations will create a diplomatic expectation that his successor will find difficult to reverse.

Spencer's assuming any of the most likely next incumbents would want to reverse such an agreement. of course - a highly improbable occurence. Even if such an arrangement would be highly unpopular with the majority of both Iraqis and Americans. The new "national security" argument for the nanny state, pioneered by Bush conservatives and taken up gladly by Clinton Dems, is that they know best which foreign fields America should be fighting in and you voters should just shut up and fear Osamas under the bed.

The actual statement has this to say about the US military's role:

To support the Iraqi government in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis; support the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism by confronting terrorists such as Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups, as well as all other outlaw groups, such as criminal remnants of the former regime; and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory.

In other words, as Spencer puts it, "we're staying in Iraq to defend Nouri al-Maliki against all enemies, foreign and domestic."

And staying was the plan all along.

Withdrawal Works Says Brit General

By Cernig

Buried at the bottom of an AP report today about falling roadside bomb numbers in Iraq is this little gem:

In Baghdad, a British commander said attacks against British and Iraqi forces have plunged by 90 percent in southern Iraq since London withdrew its troops from Basra, Iraq's second-largest city.

The presence of British forces in downtown Basra was the single largest catalyst for violence, Maj. Gen. Graham Binns told reporters Thursday on a visit to Baghdad's Green Zone.

``We thought, `If 90 percent of the violence is directed at us, what would happen if we stepped back?''' Binns said.

Britain's 5,000 troops moved out of a former Saddam Hussein palace in Basra in early September, setting up a garrison at an airport on the city's edge. The shift was part of planned reduction in British forces in Iraq to about 2,500 by next spring.

See? Withdrawal works.

As to the rest of the AP's article...

Isn't it convenient how the U.S. military can attribute dropping roadside bomb numbers to Iran carrying through on a promise to stop meddling? Now they never have to give better - indeed, any - evidence for their accusation that iran was providing EFP's in the first place. And the only pretext for this sleight-of-hand is an Iraqi claim that was never confirmed by iran, who maintain they have no state involvement in EFP or arms smuggling in the first place. No mention whatsoever that Sadr's ceasefire might be the actual cause, as yet, even though they now admit that said ceasefire is a major cause of dropping casualty rates! A truly excellent bit of smoke-and-mirrors no-one in the MSM seems to have noticed.