The Knight's Move

By Cernig

Earlier today, Fester wondered why Maliki has gone charging into a city of 2.6 million after a numerous and entrenched Mahdi Army - armed only with a division of troops possessing no heavy firepower and only lightly armored trucks. He wrote:

why was this attacked launched with what looks to be massively insuffucient force levels on the part of the Iraqi Army? Was it pure staff stupidity/buying into your own propaganda that the JAM is a bunch of thugs with no popular support? Was it that the 14th Division was the only reliable division? Was it a hope that the introduction of a large force would destablize the local equilibriums of power and thus prompt local Badr and Fadillah militia attacks?

Fester called me this evening to discuss these questions and we settled on a combination of "the 14th Division was the only reliable division" - it's recruited in Basra, commanded by SIIC loyalists and has been based in Kerbala until now - and an option he hadn't listed earlier - that Maliki planned to draw the US into the fight on his side and move his own troops back into a PR/reserve position at the earliest opportunity.

Maliki christened his offensive the "Charge of the Knights" - and in chess, beloved game of all in the region, knight's move to come at the enemy from unexpected directions. By failing to commit enough forces to fight the Mahdi Army, his operation is certain to need rescuing if his government is not to fall in turn. The US cannot, with the best will in the world, commit more than a brigade or maybe three. That's way not enough to take on a force like the Mahdi Army in a city the size of basra through boots on the ground - and so firepower, bombs and shells will be pressed into service to do the work of the missing boots. Can we say "massive collateral damage?"

What better way not only to wreck the Sadrist's plans to reduce Maliki's SIIC allies to a minority power in the regional elections but also to drive a massive wedge between Sadr and Petreaus? The latter had been careful, of late, to refer to Sadr by the honorific "Seyed" and to credit his ceasefire with a large chunk of reductions in Iraqi violence. Maliki must have felt Mookie breathing down his neck from two directions.

Well, soon no longer. The Washington Post reports that US troops are already involved in combat with the JAM in east Baghdad.

U.S. forces in armored vehicles battled Mahdi Army fighters Thursday in Sadr City, the vast Shiite stronghold in eastern Baghdad, as an offensive to quell party-backed militias entered its third day. Iraqi army and police units appeared to be largely holding to the outskirts of the area as American troops took the lead in the fighting.

Four U.S. Stryker armored vehicles were seen in Sadr City by a Washington Post correspondent, one of them engaging Mahdi Army militiamen with heavy fire. The din of American weapons, along with the Mahdi Army's AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades, was heard through much of the day. U.S. helicopters and drones buzzed overhead.

The clashes suggested that American forces were being drawn more deeply into a broad offensive that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, launched in the southern city of Basra on Tuesday.

And, according to the WaPo, the folks in the White House have been trying to figure out what Maliki's been up to as well.

Maliki decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. allies, according to administration officials. With little U.S. presence in the south, and British forces in Basra confined to an air base outside the city, one administration official said that "we can't quite decipher" what is going on. It's a question, he said, of "who's got the best conspiracy" theory about why Maliki decided to act now.

In Basra, three rival Shiite groups have been trying to position themselves, sometimes through force of arms, to dominate recently approved provincial elections.

The U.S. officials, who were not authorized to speak on the record, said that they believe Iran has provided assistance in the past to all three groups -- the Mahdi Army; the Badr Organization of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Iraq's largest Shiite party; and forces loyal to the Fadhila Party, which holds the Basra governor's seat. But the officials see the current conflict as a purely internal Iraqi dispute.

Some officials have concluded that Maliki himself is firing "the first salvo in upcoming elections," the administration official said.

"His dog in that fight is that he is basically allied with the Badr Corps" against forces loyal to Sadr, the official said. "It's not a pretty picture."

As long as Maliki has the US to back him up, and power is more important to him than stability, this is a big gamble he cannot afford not to make. Sure, if he succeeds he gets a Sadrist insurrection. But that just means he can - delay the November elections in Sadrist areas indefinitely, citing the emergency and so prop up his SIIC allies and thus his own rule; count on US troops being around for a while as they won't be able to withdraw if there's more violence, rather than less, in coming months; put paid once and for all to any chance of reproachment between the US military and Sadr. On the minus side, there's a slim chance the Mahdi Army might mount a Hezboullah-style upset and a rather larger chance that the cat-herder, Sistani, might join with Iraqi parliamentarians who are already saying Maliki should heed Sadr's call for a negotiated settlement. If Sistani backs Sadr on this, Maliki is toast and so is his government, with Sadr garnering enough backing to become de-facto Iraqi leader almost overnight. But if he did nothing, that's going to happen anyway come November. Maliki doesn't have a choice if he wants to retain power.

For Sadr, the stakes are the destruction of his carefully built up social and political infrastructure, more than his militia. There's no way SIIC would stop at just defeating the Mahdi Army, they'd want Sadr's whole operation destroyed or disabled to the point where it's no longer a threat. Sadr knows the US military likely has the firepower, if not the troop numbers, to do the first and his Shiite enemies will do it the second as soon as the first step is out of the way. If he can negotiate a settlement, especially if Sistani backs it, he wins in the same way that Maliki, Dawa and SIIC lose above.

For the US, it's a bit of a lose-lose. If they use massive firepower instead of boots, they'll incur the wrath of much of the Shiite South well beyond the Sadrists. It will be Anbar at its worst, writ large, and this time lying athwart the main route of supply. If they lose in battle to a Hezboullah-style resistance, same again.

And over the US' shoulder, there are several other problems all looking to come to a head at once. There's the increasingly disaffected Sunni Awakening, threatening a general strike or even a return to their insurgent ways in the face of Maliki's refusal to accommodate them (ironically, Sadr would be far more likely to conduct the outreach that is needed). Then there's the Kurds and the brewing blood-feud over who owns Kirkuk. And finally, when the ground in the Northern mountains thaws in April and May, the Turks are looking to follow up their recent reconnaissance in force with a proper armored incursion on the hunt for PKK terrorists. There's a very real prospect here of chaotically and accidentally converging currents creating a perfect storm for the US occupation and for peace in Iraq.

Enlisting Opinions

By Cernig

Back in August 2007, seven enlisted men wrote an op-ed for the New York Times entitled "The War as We Saw It" which was highly critical of conduct of the Iraqi occupation up until that point and of the prospects for the "Surge" to initiate real reconciliation and reconstruction in Iraq. At the time, Michael Goldfarb of the Weekly Standard wrote that, as simple enlisted men and not generals, their "perspective is too limited for their opinions to have any value regarding the progress of the war." It was a view widely agreed to by the pro-occupation and pro-Surge right.

Yet today we have another op-ed, in the Washington Post by a sergeant - and this time conservatives want to listen because they say it is proof that the Surge is working, that "we have turned the corner and will succeed in this mission if we don’t quit on it first."

Double standard? I think so.

On the other hand, I linked to the op-ed by Sergeants Omar Mora, Yancy Gray and others by way of agreeing that their comments should be taken as a valuable part of the debate about Iraq and argued that their information had meaning. I can do no less for Sergeant Anthony Diaz today. He arrived in Iraq at about the time the first op-ed was being written, and so unlike those authors cannot compare current levels of violence to those of 2004-05, when similar levels were enough to cause the breakdown of Iraqi civil society. He writes that he is struck by "financial commitment we have made to reconstruction" without noting that the actual reconstruction return on those invested billions has been comparatively paltry. And he cites his own eyewitness account to show what he feels are "the inklings of representative government; and the small yet significant progress in communal relations between the mostly Shiite Iraqi army and the predominantly Sunni residents of this area.

Late last year, I witnessed something inspirational in a rather unlikely setting: an ordinary neighborhood advisory council meeting. Attendance was the highest I had yet seen, with about 40 prominent locals present. The coalition was represented by our squadron commander, a few colonels from the embedded provincial reconstruction team and a political officer from the U.S. Embassy. Discussions ranged from the persistent lack of electricity to sewage problems to economic development. What struck me were the comments of some Sunni workers from the district's power station, who came to complain that the (mostly Shiite) Iraqi army had mistreated them and accused them of distorting the distribution of electric power, something over which these workers have little control. The men said they would strike until they received better treatment and pleaded with the council chairman, a Sunni, for help. That was an unlikely outcome, given the entrenched animosity between Shiites and Sunnis and the lack of substantive political reconciliation even at the highest levels of government here. But these men did something many Americans would take for granted: They voiced grievances and sought assistance. These are the seeds of representative government, citizens coming forth and demanding change from their representatives. Much work remains to be done, but we have clearly made a start. [Emphasis mine - C]

I would argue that this anecdote shows precisely the opposite of Diaz' interpretation. The local Sunni council is undoubtedly controlled by local Sunni tribal leaders - this is no seed of representative government, just the workings as usual of tribal politics and the Sunni/Shiite divide which has become the governing factor of all Iraqi affairs.

Back in August last year, those seven other enlisted men wrote:

Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

They also wrote that "the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably" and specifically mentioned electricity services. I see nothing in Sgt Diaz' account to contradict them.

But let us turn to a general, as Goldfarb suggested back in August. General Petraeus told the Washington Post just the other day that:

"no one" in the U.S. and Iraqi governments "feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation," or in the provision of basic public services.

And, while admitting that ceasefires by Sunnis of the Awakening and Shiites of Sadr's Mahdi Army are greatly responsible for reduced violence (more than the US troop surge, I wonder?) he also admitted that:

some elements of both the Awakening movement and the Mahdi Army may be standing down in order to prepare for the day when the U.S. presence is diminished. "Some of them may be keeping their powder dry," Petraeus said of Mahdi Army members. "Obviously you would expect some of that to happen.

Which again accord with the opinions of those seven enlisted men from August last year. So no, not a "last corner" after all.

But as Petraeus says it, despite saying those enlisted men last August knew nothing beyond their own noses, conservative pundits who have heavily invested in both the Surge and its guiding general must offer up a startling about face. My colleague Eric Martin explains:

Now that Petraeus is saying it, those that were previously bashing war critics for making this exact point...will now act as if this was the case all along, that it was obvious, and only those naive war critics - who just don't "understand war" - have ignored this reality. Better still, this dynamic will be cited as the reason that we must continue the occupation for 100-Years-to-Infinity as John McCain promises repeatedly.

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can't leave can we - I mean, what about the oil (which was so totally not a reason for this invasion at all, in any way, whatsoever, I mean, who even knew Iraq had the second largest reserve oil supply in the world)? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can't leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Which is how they play their heads we win, tails you lose game to justify perpetual occupation.

I stick by my assessment that the US Surge is preordained to fail - that internal Iraqi dynamics dictate that as soon as the various factions have cause to fight instead of hold fire, they will do so and that none are invested in finding cause not to fight while the U.S. acts as buffer and protector to all. Which means that, eventually, there will be a fight in which the US can either take sides, be shot at by all sides or withdraw. Better to withdraw first.

Iraqi Govt Folds On Awakening Strike

By Cernig

Those who follow events in Iraq will probably recall that recently a large number of Sawha, or Awakening, members went on strike in Diyala province. The local Sahwa leaders had declared "suspension of all co-operation with U.S. military, Iraqi security forces and the local government" and had left their security posts. They were calling for the dismissal of the local police chief, who they had accused of bias against Sunnis and allowing Shia militiamen and death squads to operate with impunity in the area.

Well it seems the central government has capitulated to this union-like action, which will greatly strengthen the Sawha's position as a Sunni version of Sadr's Mahdi - nationalist and not necessarily committed to violence against the state but with a strong element of social organisation as well as being an armed militia.

A Sahwa member said they have been promised the resignation of Qureyshi, the nomination of four Sunni assistants to be available to the new police chief, employment of 5,000 members of the Sahwa as government security personnel, and for the government police to stay out of predominantly Sunni districts.

That last is potentially worrysome, as such thinking will create a self-fulfilling prophecy bolstering Shiite fears of a state-within-a-state.

Recent comments by Iraqi security officials underscore the wide gap between them and the Sahwa.

General Mahdi Subeih from the interior ministry told the Saudi-owned al-Hayat newspaper in London Mar. 3: "The growth of the security role of members of the Awakening Councils has made them a third security force in the country alongside the army and the police."

Subeih said "the rebellion by some of the members of the Awakening Councils and the confrontations that erupted between them and the security forces reveal the depth of the chasm between the two sides."

"Rebellion" is a strong word to use and indicates the depth of the divide reconciliation must cross.

It looks very like, instead of reconciling, Iraqis are going to end up with a semi-balkanised situation where each faction has it's own version of Lebanon's Hezboullah - and we know where such a situation involving competing socially-invested militias ends up. Throw in an exterior military threat all the factions dislike intensely (Turkey, anyone?) and we've a recipe for decades-long conflict and instability for which the U.S. gets to play referee unless someone has the courage to pull out U.S. troops entirely.

Another "Victory" Parade

By Cernig

There's a piece in the NYT today which has the pro-occupation Right yelling "victory" all over again. It recounts some anecdotal tales that indicate a groundswell of younger Iraqis turning their backs on the violent excesses and corruption of fundementalist religion. Over at Commentary, they're leading the victory parade, calling it:

the realization of the most ambitious goal of the Iraq War: the de-radicalization of Muslim citizens. This is, in its way, more important than political reconciliation and even more important than hunting down al Qaeda. This is the long war stuff, the hearts-and-minds stuff.

The goal was to offer freedom as an alternative to extremism; the criticism was that it was a dream; the reality is that it is happening.

And the rest march in lockstep from that lead.

But of course, Commentary isn't saying who the criticism that extremism had a stranglehold on the Middle East came from. It came from that same Islamaphobic yapping conservative pack who are now claiming this as the real mission. Their hypocrisy knows no bounds.

Lefties always knew that religious fundamentalism, given free reign, will alienate the young. We've always known what moderate conservatives also know - that fundamentalism is the enemy of liberty no matter which religious flavor it comes in. Sullivan makes the point well.

Fundamentalism is, of course, based on a ridiculous lie: that God's will in every particular is ever fully knowable by humans. And when fused with politics, its intolerance and fanaticism always expose themselves. That's why the younger generation of Persians is so hostile to Islamism as well. It's why we will win the long war if we do not destroy ourselves in the process and do not unwittingly empower the fundies by our over-reaction.

One huge caveat, of course. Religious fervort comes in waves; anyone who doubts its power in the Arab Muslim world is misreading the place. But the extremes, given enough rope, often hang themselves. Look at Jordan. Now, if only we could persuade the Republicans about this fundamentalism thing ...

What secularists and moderates on both Left and Right have always said was that even so, if it was replaced by extremist nationalism or a zealous tribal ethic then the violence wouldn't stop. And it hasn't - and the newly-secular youth of Iraq are being dragged into that violence in increasing numbers. Here's the bit from the NYT article the occupation cheerleaders are managing to ignore:

The number of Iraqi juveniles in American detention was up more than sevenfold in November from April last year, and Iraq’s main prison for youth, situated in Baghdad, has triple the prewar population.

But while younger people were taking a more active role in the violence, their motivation was less likely than that of the adults to be religion-driven. Of the 900 juvenile detainees in American custody in November, fewer than 10 percent claimed to be fighting a holy war, according to the American military. About one-third of adults said they were.

A worker in the American detention system said that by her estimate, only about a third of the adult detainee population, which is overwhelmingly Sunni, prayed.

“As a group, they are not religious,” said Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, the head of detainee operations for the American military. “When we ask if they are doing it for jihad, the answer is no.”

In many cases, they're doing it for money - because the disaster that is Iraq post-occupation doesn't led them make ends meet any other way. What a heckuvva job! What a victory!

Grumpy Awakening

By Cernig

The WaPo reports that Sunni members of the Awakening in Iraq are losing patience with the Iraqi government and US occupation in increasing numbers.

Since Feb. 8, thousands of fighters in restive Diyala province have left their posts in order to pressure the government and its American backers to replace the province's Shiite police chief. On Wednesday, their leaders warned that they would disband completely if their demands were not met. In Babil province, south of Baghdad, fighters have refused to man their checkpoints after U.S. soldiers killed several comrades in mid-February in circumstances that remain in dispute.

Some force leaders and ground commanders also reject a U.S.-initiated plan that they say offers too few Sunni fighters the opportunity to join Iraq's army and police, and warn that low salaries and late payments are pushing experienced members to quit.

...U.S. efforts to manage this fast-growing movement of about 80,000 armed men are still largely effective, but in some key areas the control is fraying. The tensions are the most serious since the Awakening was launched in Anbar province in late 2006, according to Iraqi officials, U.S. commanders and 20 Awakening leaders across Iraq. Some U.S. military officials say they are growing concerned that the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq has infiltrated Awakening forces in some areas.

"Now, there is no cooperation with the Americans," said Haider Mustafa al-Kaisy, an Awakening commander in Baqubah, the capital of Diyala province, an insurgent stronghold that U.S. and Iraqi forces are still struggling to control. "We have stopped fighting al-Qaeda."

..."They should make me stronger. They should not weaken me," said Kassim, a former commander in the Islamic Army, an insurgent group. "We need weapons. We need vehicles. We do not even have gas for the few cars we have. When we joined, the Americans promised to provide all necessities. Now we know those were only words."

In the past two months, he said, 20 of his fighters have quit. Many felt their monthly salary was no longer worth the risk of fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. His men also have not received their salaries in two months, he said. "We'll all be patient for another two months. If nothing changes, then we'll suspend and quit," Kassim said. "Then we'll go back to fighting the Americans."

It's not as if this kind of talk was unexpected. DoD and military types from Gates on down have been warning that the window of opportunity the Awakening opened was a temporary one that needed to be taken advantage of. Yet the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government dragged its feet, probably fearful of arming too many Sunnis who could still turn their guns on their fellow Iraqis. Despite the military's warnings, it must be said, the Bush administration hasn't exactly hold the Iraqi government's feet to the fire over this either. Lots of talk, but no carrots and no sticks. I think that comes from their being no effective domestic pressure on the White House to do so - it's supporters, the only people it appears to listen to, were too busy cheering "victory' at last.

However, there's still, by the looks of things, time to get those carrots and sticks out. Maybe the White House will now have an incentive to do so. Although arming the Awakening comprises a potential long-term problem, by creating yet another armed group with no loyalty to the central government and a governing ideology that appears to see itself as the natural ruler of Sunni regions, in the short term it's one of the things keeping violence down in Iraq to admittedly horrible 2005 levels.

I suppose the theory is to put a bandage on the currently bleeding wound and hope to treat the body's cancer once the bleeding stops. But unfortunately the US occupation, as a paramedic, is like Edward Scissorhands. Putting a bandage on one wound seems to keep opening others. Maybe it would be better for Dr. Scissorhands to leave the patient to self-administer first aid. It would certainly seem to be the right time to try to arrange for another set of medics, rather than extending the US presence with Bush's agreement that won't be a treaty.

Contracts and All That, Guns, Guns!

Very welcome news (as provided in the second update below): Moqtada al-Sadr has decided to extend the Mahdi Army cease fire for another six months. While this is a positive development (both for US forces and, consquently, Mahdi Army forces), it is important to remember that this declaration of truce is not exactly a binding contract. It is entirely contingent on developments on the ground, namely the extent to which raids on Sadr's cadres (even non-militia members) persist.

If the US military, in alliance with factions in Iraq hostile to the Sadrist current, continue to push too hard, they will force a response from Sadr - either of his own accord or as a result of mounting pressure from an increasingly hawkish Sadrist leadership. That would not be good.

Update by Cernig How the US military is likely to react to Sadr's militia has, however, been strongly infuenced by his ceasefire. We've noted here before how Petraeus has been talking to senior Sadr aides behind the scenes and how he's instructed his officers to use respecteful forms of address when talking about Sadr. In that regard, I think this excerpt from a London Times interview with Petraeus yesterday is instructive:

The reason for the ceasefire was to enable the leadership of the movement to get a grip on individuals who had tarnished the reputation of the movement by their actions in Karbala, in assassinating two southern Governors and police chiefs, kidnapping Government officials and a journalist in Basra most recently, who was there to meet with the Sadrists officially. This is a movement that was built on the principles of the martyr Sadr, Moqtada’s father, and it was all about serving the people not extorting money from them, carrying out criminal actions against them. I think that the leadership of the movement is concerned that some of these individuals have again carried out activities that are clearly blemishes on the reputation on that movement. As they approach elections and so forth that is a big concern to them. We think that the intellectually logical move would be to continue the ceasefire, to continue to try to clean up the organisation, to deal with the rogue members in it and to try to get back to the principles that attracted the Iraqi people to it in the first place.

Petraeus there definitely sticking to the Sadrist line, rather than the old "one of the biggest threats" narrative that was previously popular.

Don't Say a Word, Don't Say Anything

Hey Surge, your slip is showing.

As Fester and Juan Cole both observed, the shaky and and occasionaly ineffectual truce between the armed components of the Sadrist current (Mahdi Army) and ISCI (Badr Corp) is likely coming to a conclusion. Cole is right to note that the timing of this coincided with the long-anticipated announcement of a target date for regional elections (October 1).

As discussed last week, the Sadrists and ISCI are pitted in a spirited struggle for mastery of the Shiite-dominated south. Due to the fact that the Sadrists boycotted regional elections in 2005, ISCI controls many of the local political institutions. Now that regional elections will be held in a matter of months, and due to the popularity of the Sadrists and the association of ISCI with the unpopular Green Zone government, the Sadrists stand to make serious inroads. Thus, the truce is off as both sides will want to have maximum range of action as they jockey for positioning during what promises to be a conflict-fraught election season.

But there is another side to this story. During the recent Sadr-imposed Mahdi Army cease fire, ISCI's Badr Corp militia (often acting under "official" cover as its units have been incorporated into Iraq's security forces) together with US forces have continued to conduct raids on Mahdi Army groups. Some of these raids were likely welcomed by Sadr in his attempt to purge unruly, disloyal and radical elements from his ranks.

But the US forces and ISCI went too far - creating a nearly untenable position for Sadr, who has been facing extreme pressure from within his movement's ranks to release his hold on the militia and respond to this aggression. Sadr is letting ISCI know that, going forward, full retaliation will result from any future assaults (with perhaps a bit of payback mixed in for good measure).

What will be interesting to watch is whether or not Sadr also drops the de facto truce between the Mahdi Army and US forces. US forces have thus far appeared unfazed by warnings from Sadr that continued assaults on his cadres would force his hand. The threats are growing louder - or, in this case, quieter:

Anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr may let a six-month cease-fire expire as soon as Saturday, a move that could send his Shiite militia fighters back out on the streets and jeopardize recent security gains that have led to a sharp decline in violence.

Sheik Salah al-Obeidi, a spokesman for al-Sadr in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, said that if the cleric failed to issue a statement by Saturday saying that the cease-fire was extended, "then that means the freeze is over." Al-Sadr's followers would be free to resume attacks.

On an Internet site representing al-Sadr, al-Obeidi said that al-Sadr "either will announce the extension or will stay silent and not announce anything. If stays silent, that means that the freeze is over."

Al-Obeidi said that message "has been conveyed to all Mahdi Army members nationwide."

The US response has thus far been respectful (using the honorific that I discussed recently):

"Al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire has been helpful in reducing violence and has led to improved security in Iraq. We would welcome the extension of the cease-fire as a positive step," he said, using an honorific reserved for descendants of the Prophet Muhammed.

While the U.S. has welcomed the cease-fire, it also has insisted on continuing to stage raids against what it calls Iranian-backed breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army militia — moves that have angered the cleric's followers.

But actions speak louder than words. Especially when silence is consent.

Update By Cernig

Talking of actions, the Roads To Iraq website passes on a report from a Sadrist website that someone has tried to assassinate Mookie.

the “Breaking News” report on Nahrain Net [Sadrists website] says; the symptoms started since month ago probably the attempt was done by a toxic or a radio active material.

The source said; there are suspicions of American - Israeli and possibly British intelligences behind this assassination attempt.

This source did not give more details but he said that the situation is under control.

And is also saying that the Awakening Council is ready for war with JAM if it breaks its general ceasefire.

Update 2 Thursday - AP is reporting that a Sadr statement is to be read in mosques on Friday. Given that the Sadrists had said that if the ceasefire was to end there would be no statement at all, this seems to be good news.

Sadr Looks To Extend Ceasefire

By Cernig

Will he or won't he? Shiite cleric/politician/militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr is reported to be ready to extend his Mahdi Army's six month ceasefire - and possibly even begin transforming the militia into a humanitarian organisation.

Significantly, Gen Petraeus is saying he's already been told the extension will go ahead, before there's been any official announcement. Here at Newshoggers, we've pointed recently to signs of deals between the US military and the radical cleric once described by the Pentagon as the single biggest threat to peace in Iraq. Petraeus is now giving Sadr credit for his part in the drop in violence which many in the US want to atribute solely to the Surge:

"For the good of Iraq and to enable us to continue pursuing al Qaeda without watching our back, to enable Iraq to continue momentum in the areas of rebuilding and reconstruction ... all of that argues for a continuation of the ceasefire," he said.

"The ceasefire has been ... a factor that has resulted in a reduction of violence in Iraq."

...Petraeus said that if Sadr wanted to see U.S. forces leave, it made sense to renew the ceasefire.

"Frankly, if the overall objective is to get a timetable for the removal of coalition forces or something like along those lines, quit shooting at us because over time we are going to go," Petraeus said.

There are also reports, however, that a continuation of the ceasefire would mean a split in the organisation as many within Sadr's bloc believe their rivals in the Iraqi government - primarily the Badr Brigade's sponsors SCIRI, will continue to use the iraqi and US militaries to attack Sadr's men. To get a ceasefire extension, Petraeus is going to have to have promised to get both his own troops and Iraqi ones to quit shooting at mainstream Mahdi Army groups too.

Stuck at 15

The BBC is reporting that the US is not seeing any sustained and significant changes in trend lines that would allow a further drawdown from the surge force of twenty combat brigades to the barely sustainable steady state force of fifteen brigades this summer:

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has said he favours a "pause" in troop reductions in Iraq after up to 30,000 US soldiers are sent home this summer.

The Pentagon aims to decrease troop numbers in Iraq from 20 to 15 brigades. One brigade has already left, the last of the five is due to leave by July.

After meeting the US commander in Iraq, Gen David Petraeus, Mr Gates said he wanted a "period of evaluation"....

The defence secretary has previously expressed hope that the drawdown could continue until 10 brigades remained by the end of 2008.

But there have been fears that recent security gains could be reversed if too many troops are withdrawn too soon.

Another six months of fifteen brigades in Iraq will accomplish the only plausible mission left --- kicking the problem off onto another Administration. Those security gains have come from sucking the blood out of the concept of a post-Westphalian Iraqi state and devolving power to 'competing armed interesting groups' that do not have significant alignment or areas of agreement with either the United States or the Maliki government.

Beware Of Closing Doors

By Cernig

Think-tank types - and not just those on the Left - are beginning to write that the window of opportunity the Surge was intended to force open is now closing. But if the window for the Iraqi government to firmly grasp reconciliation is closing then so is the US' chance to head for the exit while on a Surge of favorable news.

Spencer Ackerman had an excellent article yesterday on the closing window that is also a door and today journalist and blogger Shaun Mullen writes:

You don’t have to be a bloody genius to know that sooner or later the window of opportunity for Iraqi national reconciliation and a lasting reduction in sectarian violence as a result of the successes of the Surge would begin to close unless there was progress on the part of the Baghdad government.

Well, boys and girls, it would appear that the window is indeed beginning to close since there has been no progress whatsoever except for a totally bogus un-de-Baathification law passed earlier this month.

As a consequence, insurgents have predictably adapted their tactics amidst this power vacuum, there has been an up-tick in high-profile bombings and U.S. and civilian casualties, and the level of violence in Mosul is at a two-year high despite intense U.S. pacification efforts. The twin suicide bombings that took over 50 lives in mainly Shiite areas of Baghdad today were the worst since additional U.S. troops began flooding into the capital last spring.

...the Al-Maliki government has no incentive to take advantage of the opening the Surge has given it because President Bush has given something far more important to he and his Shiite cronies — coup insurance in the form of a long-term troop presence. This is the status quo for the foreseeable future. There is no post-Surge strategy, let alone an endgame, because in the Bush Universe politics yet again trump policy.

Al Qaeda has always proven adaptable to new US tactics and it should come as no surprise that they have done so again. Yet it always does come as a surprise to the Bush cheerleading set, who focus on AQ's barbarism (and yes, they are barbaric) to the extent of denying to themselves that even monsters can be smart monsters. It doesn't matter how many military battles the US wins - it will lose in the long run if AQ can simply help keep Iraq unstable. The political dynamic in Iraq means AQ can claim victory just by not surviving but the Bush administration (and it's supporters) are deliberately myopic about Iraq's internicine mess simply because it holds little hope of good news, let alone victory.

So the US finds itself in a no-win situation. To withdraw now would seem to invite either a civil war or the ascendancy of nationalists from both Sunni and Shiite sides who would be no use at all in forming a bastion of pro-American power in the Middle East. Yet to remain to try prevent this occuring will only put off the inevitable while bloodying American hands as AQI adapts, the Sunni Awakening get frustrated with Maliki's intransigence then starts shooting again and Sadr's ceasefire eventually ends. Bush has punted the whole issue, leaving it for the next president - or perhaps even the one after that - to tell the US public the bad news. That the US should have gotten out while the getting was comparatively good.

Update Our own Eric Martin points to news that even the de-Ba'athification law is in trouble. Sunni Vice-President Tareq al-Hashemi said the Presidential Council is unlikely to ratify the law because "the spirit of revenge is so clear in many articles of the law." If the Presidential Council is unanimous on this - and Hashimi says they are - then the law is dead in the water.

What's Going On In Mosul?

By Cernig

I'm only asking because the US media's reporting on Iraq seems to have devolved to the level of reporting on hit-and-run accidents. What's going on in Mosul?

Not more than a few weeks back we were being told that Mosul was one of the Surge's great successes, enabling a drawdown of US forces to only one battalion from a high of over two dozen. Suddenly, Al Qaeda, we are told, has regrouped in the city. There was a massive explosion that killed as many as 50 and has been blamed on AQ (although insurgency-loyal websites have a different story). A suicide bomber killed provincial police chief Brigadier General Salah al-Juburi and two other officers the next day when they went to inspect the carnage. There were five US soldiers killed today in another explosion. There are rumors that Gadhafi's son is helping AQ there. The Iraqi Army has moved its tiny supply of tanks and helicopters into the city along with major reinforcements. The latter alone tells you there's a crisis of sorts, and if it doesn't then the Defense Minister's saying that "The situation in Mosul is worse than imagined by far" will.

And all of this popped up out of nowhere and escalated into the current security crisis just after reports of an Iraqi soldier who shot and killed two US servicemen just after Christmas. He was called an Al Qaeda member but local reports claimed he had become angry when US soldiers beat a pregnant woman and opened fire after arguing with them. Lefalets distributed in Mosul exhorted locals to emulate the soldier, known as Caesar. Could there be a connection? If so, then it is in the interests of both the Iraqi authorities and US military to downplay it and the mainstream media isn't looking to see if there is one. They're content with their stenography of the story of the last stand of a mysteriously and suddenly resurgent Al Qaeda. Yet an AQI that has such a regenerative ability to regroup and resupply would be just as problemmatic in its own way as a Sunni backlash following the Caesar incident, which should be garnering more attention than it is.

Mookie's Makeover

By Cernig

According to Newsweek magazine, Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army may be the next recipient of US largesse as Petreaeus looks to the firebrand cleric to expand the Awakening. I'm hoping my colleague Eric Martin will also have something to say about this story later but I want to flag up a line from the Newsweek piece that really encapsulates the story:

Petraeus recently started using the honorific "seyed" when referring to Sadr and has asked U.S. officers to do the same.

The honorific denotes males accepted as descendants of the Islamic prophet Muhammad through his grandsons, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn ibn Ali. Petraeus is thus signalling American acceptance that Sadr is a primary player in Iraqi political and religious life, not just an insurgent menace.

If Petraeus does move to bring the Mahdi Army into the Awakening, then watch as yet again those who have previously been designated by the pro-war cheerleaders as terrorist cockroaches (who must never be negotiated with or appeased in any way) become suddenly acceptable allies in their eyes. Their ability to spin their opinions on a dime as long as it accords with the White House message never ceases to amaze me.

Petraeus For NATO?

By Cernig

There's a New York Times report this morning that Saint-General Petraeus is being considered for the job of Supreme Allied Commander at NATO.

A senior Pentagon official said that it was weighing “a next assignment for Petraeus” and that the NATO post was a possibility. “He deserves one and that has also always been a highly prestigious position,” the official said. “So he is a candidate for that job, but there have been no final decisions and nothing on the timing.”

There follows much hot air from the NYT about Saint Pet being too needed in Iraq to be sent elsewhere, indicative of just how much the Very Serious person set has built Bush's favorite up as God's Own Answer to all that ails that nation. It's bullsh*t of course. The VSP's never mention Petraeus' abyssmal performance as overseer of training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, during which billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of weapons went missing leaving several senior officers indicted for corruption and even one of Petraeus' own aides under investigation.

Still, I'm inclined to agree with James Joyner - who works for the Atlantic Council - that Petraeus to NATO as a pure publicity move would signal that the U.S. wants NATO to repurpose itself away from the fight for the Fulda Gap and put public pressure on the other members to accelerate that process. It would also help to thrust Afghanistan back into the American public consciousness - something that really needs to be done before defeat is snatched from the jaws of victory there. That's a good move in itself, I feel, and stands aside from any actual consideration of whether Petraeus would be any good at the job.

As to the next commander in Iraq, Gate's senior aide Chiarelli would seem to be the obvious choice right now if the Pentagon is serious about it's newfound counterinsurgency paradigm, but I would suggest Colonel H.R. McMaster. He pioneered many of the Surge tactics Saint Pet has gotten credit for at Tal Afar in 2005 and knows more about effective COIN at the sharp end than Petraeus ever will. But because of his view that senior officers have a constitutional duty to speak out when the civilian leadership f**ks up, he's been passed over for promotion to Brig. General twice. He's the best commander MNF-I will never have.

No Evidence Marines Attacked During Afghan 10-Mile Massacre

By Cernig

Does anyone recall the most under-reported alleged atrocity of the War on Terror to date, the case of a Marine unit in Afghanistan which the Afghani government and human right's groups in the country accuse of going on a ten mile rampage, massacring civilians? It happened in March last year but there's only now a Court of Inquiry to see if courts martial should be in the offing.

Authorities found no evidence that a Marine unit was responding to an ambush last year when troops allegedly opened fire indiscriminately on Afghan civilians, killing as many as 19, a Navy investigator testified Monday.

But, Navy authorities did not arrive on the scene until two months later and had only an hour to look at the site of the shooting, Marine Chief Warrant Officer Robert O'Dwyer cautioned.

"From a law enforcement standpoint, that's ludicrous," O'Dwyer said. He said that while one investigation later determined two civilians died and 23 were wounded, another concluded 19 died and 50 were wounded.

O'Dwyer's testimony opened the second week of a Court of Inquiry, a rarely used administrative fact-finding proceeding investigating the actions of two officers involved in the shootings: Company commander Maj. Fred C. Galvin, 38, of the Kansas City area, and Capt. Vincent J. Noble, 29, of Philadelphia, a platoon leader.

The court will recommend whether any charges should filed against the officers, and whether any training should be changed.

O'Dwyer said Navy Criminal Investigative Service agents interviewed Afghan police and civilians, and members of an Army military police unit that arrived on the scene less than an hour after the shooting. He said none confirmed the Marine unit's story that there was a coordinated ambush.

...Citing witness accounts, Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission concluded last year that the Marines fired indiscriminately at pedestrians and people in cars, buses and taxis in six different locations along a 10-mile (16-kilometer) stretch of roadway.

A Marine riding in the convoy testified last week that the convoy was shot at twice and Marines fired back over a span of roadway about 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers) long. Navy investigators said the firing occurred over about six miles (10 kilometers), O'Dwyer said.

Six miles is still a heck of a long way, and 19 to 23 dead easily puts this incident in the realms of the Blackwater incident in Iraq which has garnered so much press coverage.

Of course, it might be easier to tell what exactly happened if the on-scene Marine commander hadn't confiscated and destroyed photos and video taken by freelance journalists working for AP at the time, who captured much of what occured.

The justification used back then?

..."Investigative integrity is one circumstance when civil and military authorities will reluctantly exercise the right to control what a journalist is permitted to document," Col. Victor Petrenko, chief of staff to the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan, said in a letter Friday.

He added that photographs or video taken by "untrained people" might "capture visual details that are not as they originally were."

Or, indeed, capture visual details at all.

The current article notes that the Marine unit in question was sent out of Afghanistan after the incident. What it doesn't say is that it was sent to Iraq. Although the Army has apologised for civilain deaths during the incident on the Marine Corp's behalf, the Corps insists that the apology was "premature".

More on deBaathification

I have to second Libby's suspician that de-Ba'athification is Arabic for "Clear Skies Initiative." As she notes, via Juan Cole, the supporters of the de-Ba'athification measure that passed were the hard-core anti-Ba'athists, the Sadrists and the Kurds who have suffered the most from the Ba'ath party. Much like Tom DeLay believed the perfect vote was 218-217 with a misleading name, the Iraqi Parliament saw 48% of its members not be present on this major piece of 'reconciliation.'

And now the Washington Post reports that the de-Ba'athification bill will put more Sunni Arabs out of work

The new measure could lead to a new purge of members of the current Iraqi government, Lami said, including about 7,000 officers in the Interior Ministry. Even influential Iraqi security force officials who used to be Baathists could face removal.

"The commander of the Baghdad security plan and his assistants, according to the new law, they should retire," he said.

The New York Times is reporting a larger number of potential purgable slots:

One Shiite politician, who spoke on condition that his name not be used, said the new law could forcibly retire up to 27,000 former Baathists, who would receive pensions.

If the intent of a modified de-Ba'athificiation law was to give more former Ba'ath Party members, overwhelmingly Sunni Arabs, stakes in a successful and peaceful Iraq as a unified nation-state, then there are no real stakes being offered here. However looking at the Washington Post report that the head of the Baghdad security plan and his senior leaders, as well as the overwhelming Sadrist and Kurdish support, the intent is to make sure that the Sunni Arab population is marginalized and is never in a position to mount an effective coup becomes much clearer.

Objectives and outcomes

Military action should be taken to achieve or to create conditions to achieve desired political outcomes. That is bastardized Clauswitz, bastardized Sun Tsu and bastardized 4th Generation thought. How you get to the point of military success within an integrated political/strategic framework changes over time, but the constant objective of successful military actions is integrating those actions into a broader scope and strategy. These are the evaluative standards of success --- have the desired political outcomes been achieved?

The Surge is a military campaign that had broad strategic outcomes and pathways in mind to see if it could achieve desirable political ends. So let's see what has happened within the political scope. We can start by looking at his political outcomes that he desired, which he was nice enough to actually enunciate and differentiate from pablum and crap last January. I'll break it down into bullet points:

To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.

To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis.

To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs.

To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year.

And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws,

* and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.

The underlying assumption on these metrics is that achieving these goals will move Iraq and Iraqi societies towards a unified, reasonably stable, US friendly nation state with a reasonably exercised near monopoly on force, and a monopoly on legitimate force. Let's keep that in mind.

The first one has not happened. As Cernig noted earlier today, the plan is turn Anbar over to local security forces in March. A smart-ass may suggest that security in Anbar has always been in the hands of local security forces and it has been the damn foreigners trying to muscle in on local political/economic arrangements that have caused all the trouble, but I am not such a smart ass. Through mid-December eleven of eighteen provinces are under Iraqi government security responsibilities.

Oil revenue sharing has been a morass. Shi'ite ministers have accused Kurdish oil deals of being negotiated illegally and in bad faith. Draft laws have been read and laughed in and out of committee, and any oil deal exposes massive fissures within every interested party at the national level. The few deals that have been cut seem to be pay-offs to Bush supporters first and foremost.

Unemployment levels are hard to measure. Brookings Iraq Index published on 1/2/08 data stops by mid-summer of 2007, and they were guesstimating a constant 25 to 40% unemployment figure. This has been their rough estimate for the past two years. There is a reasonable chance that the decrease in violence levels from the peak 2006 and 2007 levels towards 2004 and 2005 levels will lead to increases in economic activity and thus increased employment. However I can not verify that assumption right now. There is a counter-argument that one of the major drivers of decreased violence has been the partitioning of major cities, especially Baghdad into walled ethnic enclaves. Cities exist economically as mixing grounds of loose ties and the combination of personal no-go zones, and walls decrease the opportunities of productive mixing. Furthermore the Iraqi government has not passed a 2008 budget as of last week so any additional expenditures that may have occurred due to the surge are one-off events. With this said, it is plausible that this goal was met.

Local leaders have been empowered, but not through elections. The deals that the US has cut with the Awakening Councils have empowered Sunni Arab tribal leadership at the cost of de-legitimating the Shi'ite dominated central government. Press reports have consistently shown that the Sunni Arab 'Concerned Local Citizens'/insurgents who want a reliable paycheck believe that they achieved their basic political goals of not having to pay attention to Baghdad's central government. And now that they have been able to form large units they are 'competing armed interest groups' that as soon as US airpower is no longer a major concern, can ramp violence levels back up to conventional levels and reinvigorate a full fledged civil war.

De-Baathification is a massive threat to the Shi'ite government as they remember exactly how the Sunni Arab minority has been able to wield power for most of the 20th century -- armed military coups. The social and political networks are in place if experienced Baath and insurgent individuals for such a coup to occur again, especially now that there are 'armed competing interest groups.' Not gonna happen.

Same thing with the constitutional amendment process. This has always been Lucy's football.

So on its overt political objectives, the surge has failed. There has been some good, mainly a drop in violence metrics from mid-surge/mid summer highs to levels last seen in 2004 (when the strategic situation was still a fiasco), and a rapid deceleration of ethnic cleansing (mainly because the first wave has been completed by the various militias), and no major US-Iran confrontation. But is has failed to produce a long lasting change in political coalitions, factions or trend lines.

Now if you happen to be a bit cynical and believe that the surge's political objectives were to either kick the can for another year or to entrench the US as the primary balancing player between multiple armed interest groups with a weak client government that needs a massive US presence to survive, then either set of political outcomes has been achieved.

Taliban Leader Bribes Himself Free For Third Time

By Cernig

Just...wow.

A Taleban commander in Afghanistan responsible for leading attacks on British troops says he has been freed from prison after paying a bribe.

Mullah Sorkh Naqaibullah told the BBC he paid $15,000 (£7,500) to the Afghan authorities to win his freedom.

It was the third time that the leader, known as the "Red Mullah", had been captured and released, he said.

Mullah Naqaibullah operates in Helmand province, where there is a large concentration of British troops.

He told the BBC he had been released from custody for the third time in three years after paying a bribe to an Afghan National Directorate of Security official.
...An NDS spokesman refused to comment on his allegations, saying he could not confirm whether the reports were right or wrong.

But another NDS source confirmed that Mullah Naqaibullah had been released, and that an investigation had begun to track down those responsible.

A Taleban spokesman said Mullah Naqaibullah had returned to Helmand.

I mean, WTF?

Pakistan has a catch-and-release policy for Taliban bigwigs too. What kind of crappy War on Some Terror is being run here if that's what our ostensible allies are up to? No, don't answer that - a really crappy one.

Two US Troops Killed By Iraqi Soldier - But Why?

By Cernig

Here's a story getting a lot of play from various news outlets today - an Iraqi soldier shot and killed two US servicemen in Mosul, Iraq. It's the first known case of an intentional killing of American troops by an Iraqi soldier since the 2003 invasion.
. The AP, Reuters and others are all carrying the story, as Smintheus notes in a roundup of the coverage at DKos today.

The NY Times has the fullest version of events as currently being put out by the Iraqi Army:

In what would be the first publicly disclosed case of an Iraqi Army soldier deliberately killing American servicemen since the 2003 invasion, two American soldiers were apparently shot on purpose last month by an Iraqi soldier on patrol with them in the northern city of Mosul, senior Iraqi officers said on Saturday.

The killings occurred the day after Christmas as a joint American-Iraqi patrol was setting up a combat outpost in a dangerous neighborhood of western Mosul. Gunmen hiding in a building and in a car opened fire on the patrol, the Iraqi officers said. During the brief firefight, one of the Iraqi soldiers turned his weapon on his unsuspecting American allies, they said.

The Iraqi soldier is suspected of killing Capt. Rowdy J. Inman and Sgt. Benjamin B. Portell, and also wounding three other American soldiers and one civilian interpreter, according to the American military command in Baghdad. No Iraqi soldiers were killed or wounded, according to one Iraqi commander.

The Iraqi soldier tried to flee the scene, but he was apprehended after being identified by other Iraqi soldiers, according to American military officials. Two Iraqi soldiers are now in custody in connection with the shootings, the military said, suggesting that the soldier may have been aided by at least one accomplice.

The soldier who shot the Americans was a turncoat tied to the insurgency, said Brig. Gen. Mutaa Habib al-Khazraji, a commander in the Iraqi Army’s Second Division in Mosul, in a telephone interview on Saturday. During the firefight, he “seized the opportunity” and fired on the American soldiers, killing two of them, the general said, adding that the Iraqi soldier “was an infiltrator.”

That's pretty much the version being accepted by all the media outlets - even though the US military itself is still saying that the circumstances around the shooting are unclear.

The American military said the motives for the shooting “are as yet unknown.” Maj. Gary Dangerfield, an American military spokesman in Mosul, confirmed that two Iraqi soldiers are now being held at an undisclosed location in Iraq and that investigators are examining possible insurgent links.

“From everything we have right now, we feel pretty confident that we have the right guy,” Major Dangerfield said, based on eyewitness statements from other Iraqi and American soldiers. “The motive behind what he did or how close he was to any insurgent activity is still unclear. We continue to look into every nook and cranny of this investigation.”

He said the Iraqi commander of the Second Army Division ordered an “immediate stand-down of the unit” and cooperated with the investigation. “We will not let this tragic isolated incident hinder our partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces and keep us from establishing security in our area of operation,” he said.

The US military had originally only said that the two Americans were killed by “small arms fire during dismounted combat operations” and didn't speak about the circumstances at all until Reuters led with the Iraqi Army's version.

However, on the partisan Sunni Arab side of the street there's a rather different story. There, they name the Iraqi soldier - probably a Sunni in the predominantly Shiite military - as one Caesar Saadi and say that he shot the two soldiers because:

An American soldier at one point began to beat and kick a pregnant Iraqi woman, prompting the Iraqi...soldier to try to intervene. The confrontation between him and the American escalated to gunfire when Sa‘di, the “National Guard” soldier opened fire on the American and his companions.

They also say that graffiti and leaflets have begun appearing in Mosul saying "well done, Caesar".

The only reason it appears this contrary tale doesn't appear in Western reporting of the incident is that no-one hunkered in the Green Zone bothered to look beyond the version put out by the Iraqi authorities. However, if U.S. military investigations into the incident were also examining such allegations then that would explain both the initial US reluctance to give out too many details or indeed to follow the Iraqi official version too closely now.

Let me make this clear - I find the Sunni insurgency version being given space by Iraqi papers neither more nor less credible than the official Iraqi military version. Such things have been accused before and on separate occasions have turned out both to be real happenings and fictitious propaganda. However, there have been coverups by both Iraqi and US authorities on some of the occasions when such allegations proved to be true in the past. I hope and mostly believe (in a "trust but verify" way) that isn't happening here - maybe Bob Owens can exploit his enviable connections with MNF-I to find out, in which case we bloggers can add another aspect to the story.

No, what I mean to highlight is that an important story with a massively negative potential "hearts and minds" impact has been missed by a Western media confined to the relative safety of imbeds and Green Zone reliance on stringers. The best way to deal with that potential is to acknowledge and cover the version in the Iraqi Sunni press and, should it be debunked, to say so loudly and with voluminous proof. Should it prove true, on the other hand, ignoring it will not make its impact disappear from the streets of Mosul.

Update Jan 6th The Iraqi and US militaries have denied the accusations, according to the WaPo:

In a statement released Saturday night, an anti-American Sunni group identified the Iraqi soldier as Qaisar Saadi al-Jubory and said he shot the Americans after their unit refused to stop beating a pregnant woman. "We do what we want," the Iraqi said the U.S. troops told him, according to the statement, which was posted on the Association of Muslim Scholars Web site.

Iraqi and American officials said there did not appear to be any basis to accusations that the U.S. soldiers had mistreated Iraqi civilians. "It is baseless and untrue," Khazraji said.

"There is no indication of anything like that," said a senior U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the investigation is ongoing. "He just did it, and it's not clear what his motivation was. It appears to have been a total surprise."

The US denial is rather less unequivocal than the Iraqi one, and investigations continue.

Colonialism In Action

By Cernig

Following on from my post yesterday about the Iraqi government's determination to disband the various Awakenings so beloved of pro-occupation pundits, Kevin Drum points to an NY Times article which should be read in full.

In interviews with Awakening groups in 10 locations — four interviewed during a week in Anbar, and six groups in and around Baghdad interviewed over several days — it was evident that the groups were improving security in their areas. But it is also clear that there is little loyalty, in either direction, between the Sunni groups and the Shiites who run the government.

Kevin spots the money quotes, though:

"The Americans are haunted by the possibility that Iraq could go the way of Afghanistan, where Americans initially bought the loyalty of tribal leaders only to have some of them gravitate back to the Taliban when the money stopped."

And then there's this from the Iraqi side: "Many people believe this will end with tens of thousands of armed people, primarily Sunnis, and this will excite the Shiite militias to grow and in the end it will grow into a civil war," said Safa Hussein, the deputy national security adviser and a point man on the Awakening program for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

The Awakening movement as it has been encouraged by the U.S. military is classic colonialist divide-and-conquer as perfected by the Brits in South Africa and India. Keeping the most warlike minority group as a private mercenary arm of the occupiers while staffing the main security forces with the main ethnic group's people. The trouble is, as the the Brits frequently found out, this isn't a stable dynamic unless you're willing to pay a periodic price in blood as tensions spill over into open rebellion by one of those two groups - either against the occupier or the indigenous puppet government. The carefully set-up opposition force can then be employed to ruthlessly put down dissent. Until, in time, a Mandela or Ghandi comes along and makes further occupation untenable.

“We don’t want to create a parallel government,” General Odierno said. He's right there. He wants neither to be capable of governing, just of scaring their opposite numbers into acquiescence.

Iraq Govt. Pledges To Disband Awakening

By Cernig

This really rips a hole in it, doesn't it?

The statement from Defense Minister Abdul-Qadir al-Obaidi was the government's most explicit declaration yet of its intent to eventually dismantle the groups backed and funded by the United States as a vital tool for reducing violence.

The militias, more than 70,000 strong and often made up of former insurgents, are known as Awakening Councils, or Concerned Local Citizens.

``We completely, absolutely reject the Awakening becoming a third military organization,'' al-Obaidi said at a news conference.

He added that the groups would also not be allowed to have any infrastructure, such as a headquarters building, that would give them long-term legitimacy.

``We absolutely reject that,'' al-Obaidi said.

The government has pledged to absorb about a quarter of the men into the predominantly Shiite-controlled security services and military, and provide vocational training so that the rest can find jobs. Integration would also allow Sunnis to regain lost influence in the key defense and interior ministries.

``We've kicked al-Qaida out and we don't want chaos to take their place,'' said Sheik Hate Ail, a tribal leader who helped form one of the groups in the western province of Anbar.

He added that the government should not ``brazenly exploit the sacrifices of these Iraqi'' fighters and ``should absorb these people, not reject them and send them away.''

The government has been vague about its plans and the interior ministry has agreed to hire about 7,000 men so far on temporary contracts, and plans to hire an additional 3,000. But the ministry has neither specified the length of the contracts nor the positions the men would fill.

That noise you heard was the much-vaunted "window of opportunity" for Iraqi reconcilliation - opened by the Awakening and Sadr's ceasefire and taken credit for by Petraeus and his Surge - slamming shut. You can only play divide and conquer for so long before it ceases being a stabilizing measure and becomes a dangerously divisive one instead.