The Pentagon Rediscovers Counterinsurgency

There's a new counterinsurgency manual for the U.S. military.

The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces.

The current military leadership in Iraq has already embraced many of the ideas in the doctrine. But some military experts question whether the Army and the Marines have sufficient troops to carry out the doctrine effectively while also preparing for other threats.

This new manual is being touted as a major change in the way the U.S. military will operate:

The new doctrine is part of a broader effort to change the culture of a military that has long promoted the virtues of using firepower and battlefield maneuvers in swift, decisive operations against a conventional enemy.

“The Army will use this manual to change its entire culture as it transitions to irregular warfare,” said Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who served in 2003 as the acting chief of staff of the Army. “But the Army does not have nearly enough resources, particularly in terms of people, to meet its global responsibilities while making such a significant commitment to irregular warfare.”

The spirit of the document is captured in nine paradoxes that reflect the nimbleness required to win the support of the people and isolate insurgents from their potential base of support — a task so complex that military officers refer to it as the graduate level of war.

Instead of massing firepower to destroy Republican Guard troops and other enemy forces, as was required in the opening weeks of the invasion of Iraq, the draft manual emphasizes the importance of minimizing civilian casualties. “The more force used, the less effective it is,” it notes.

Stressing the need to build up local institutions and encourage economic development, the manual cautions against putting too much weight on purely military solutions. “Tactical success guarantees nothing,” it says.

Noting the need to interact with the people to gather intelligence and understand the civilians’ needs, the doctrine cautions against hunkering down at large bases. “The more you protect your force, the less secure you are,” it asserts.

However, as James Joyner points out, the blinkered attitude towards counterinsurgency operations that has characterized the Bush administration's planning until now has been a new innovation, not a long-term problem:

the idea that the American military doesn’t understand how to fight counterinsurgency is nonsense. We’ve been doing it successfully since the French and Indian War. The United States Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual has been a seminal book on the subject since 1940.

The problem isn’t doctrine but culture. Since at least the 1993 debacle in Somalia, it has been clear that our force was not properly configured for what we now call peace and stability operations. We lack sufficient civil affairs, special forces, military police, engineer, translator, and psychological operations assets.

And it isn't as if there weren't other experts available. The British Army is one of the most successful counterinsurgency outfits of the last 50 years, with a wealth of experience and a doctrine that is exactly like this new U.S. manual. British commanders consistently warned the Bush administration but were ignored.

Pity that James Joyner then goes on to shoot himself in the foot by making the obligatory bow to the Republican loyalty squads:

To his credit, Don Rumsfeld began to change this a few years ago. But the speed and scope of the change has been inadequate to the operations tempo.

I'm going to repeat what I said in Joyner's comments.

Oftimes political loyalty is a laudable thing but there comes a point where it becomes blinkered against the truth and this administration has long passed that point.

Rumsfield talks a good game on reconstruction, but his tenure at Defense has been characterized by dropping multiple billions into black-hole boondoggles like the ABM system, DDX destroyers, F-22s for anti-IED operations, nuclear subs for special ops insertions and especially the Future Combat Systems program. Every single one has been plagued by over-runs, cost-plus pork and program failures that are pushing the definition of Cheop’s Law to untold heights.

You’re right that this manual is nothing new - it is a reprint of stuff that’s been known for a long time, as evidenced by not just that 1940 Marine text but also more recent work by the likes of William S. Lind, the man who coined the term Fourth Generational warfare and who anticipated every single thing that has gone wrong in the Occupation President’s misadventures.

Most non-loyalist analysts agree, the truth is that the Bush administration is led and misled by old and cold warriors who agreed with the neoconservative movement (who firmly believed that conventional Third Generation forces would suffice to create their New American Century). Amazingly, neocons were still writing that a Third generation force can prevail in counterinsurgency as late as the first two weeks of the recent conflict in Lebanon - but, oddly, not since.

The Bush cold warriors and the neocons deliberately threw out every doctrine of counterinsurgency and imposed their beliefs on the military - with unfortunate and entirely forseeable results. They then persisted for years in not learning from the mistakes they wouldn’t admit they made (in some cases even to the present day). Their lack of mental discipline and responsibility to the American public in not reality-checking their pet theories should be blamed, not apologized for.