Wednesday, November 16, 2005

William S. Lind's Iraq Exit Strategy

While Democrats and Republicans keep the media attention on themselves by arguing over who was told what and when, observers would be forgiven for not noticing that not one of them has a blessed clue about what to do next in hard terms. Bush is for staying the course, McCain wants to magically make 10,000 extra troops appear from nowhere, Kerry is being clever and calling for a 20,000 troop reduction in January that he knows is planned to happen anyway through simple unit rotation. The anti-war left want withdrawal but have no real plan to do this without wrecking Iraq even further (I admit to being in this category), the Democrat leadership want to withdraw troops and stay the course and the Reublicans of Senate and House have their heads in the sand.

And so it is left to rightwinger William S. Lind, the man who wrote the book on counter-insurgency warfare and who was talking about "oil-spots" a year ago, to come up with the first real exit strategy.

Please note that I am not talking about how to win the Iraq war. The war was lost from before the first bomb fell, because the strategic objectives were never attainable no matter what we did. Further blunders, from de-Baathification and sending the Iraqi Army home through mistreating the civilian population, have moved us from mere failure to incipient disaster. The question, rather, is how we might get out without our defeat being so obvious as to be undeniable.

So here is my proposal:

First, announce that we will leave Iraq soon, and completely. Not one American base or soldier will remain on Iraqi soil. The spin should be, “We came only to remove Saddam from power, and we have accomplished that mission. Iraq now has a constitution and an elected government; we have no reason to remain.”

Second, open negotiations to set a date by which we will be gone. The formal negotiations will be with the Iraqi government. Behind the scenes, we will have to set a deadline for achieving an agreement, failing which we will announce a withdrawal unilaterally.

Governments established by foreign powers may be reluctant to see foreign troops leave.

The critical (and secret) negotiations, however, will not be with Iraq’s puppet government, but with the Sunnis. Here, what we need is what is sometimes called a “diplomatic revolution.” Instead of siding with the Kurds and Shiites against the Sunnis, we need to offer the Sunnis an alliance. The terms would be roughly these:

We will set and adhere to a date for complete withdrawal;

We will cease all attacks on the Sunni resistance, as part of a mutual cease-fire; and

We will use such political influence as we retain with Iraq’s Shiite-Kurdish condominium to protect and advance the Sunnis’ interests.

In return, the Sunnis will:

Enforce a cease-fire in the Sunni provinces, and

Clean up al Qaeda in Iraq. If they need and want our help to do that, we will help. I doubt they will need any assistance from us, beyond stopping our attacks in Sunni areas, and I doubt even more they will want it, since it would de-legitimize them.

Third, while we will cease our useless “sweeps” and other clearly offensive actions, we will also quietly institute the “ink-blot strategy” in some mixed Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish areas. While the ink-blot strategy (like the CAP program in Vietnam) represents a strategic offensive, which allows us to keep pressure on the Sunnis to make a deal, it requires de-escalation on the tactical level, so as not to alienate the local population. That should help reduce both Sunni and American casualties while negotiations proceed.

As I have noted in previous columns, a problem in Fourth Generation conflicts is finding someone with whom to negotiate, someone who can deliver once a deal is made. Here, events in Iraq may have given us an opportunity. According to the October 27 Christian Science Monitor, Iraq’s key Sunni political parties have formed a new coalition. That coalition is, to quote the Monitor, “Islamist, vehemently anti-American, opposed to foreign troops, and discreetly pro-insurgency.” I think it is safe to add that it is closely tied to the Baathist elements of the insurgency, which are both a large part of the resistance and strongly opposed to al Qaeda.

All those characteristics make it a credible negotiating partner. Negotiations with Sunni Quislings serve no purpose, because the Quislings can’t deliver what we need, a quieting down of the fighting while we get out. There is good reason to think the new Sunni coalition could deliver that. In turn, we could deliver what they need, which is political support vis-à-vis the Shiites and Kurds.


I have to confess to liking this strategy. It accords with much of my previous thoughts on Iraq and answers, perhaps, the one major question of withdrawal that seemed intractable - "how do we exit without leaving behind a civil war?"

Lindt goes on to suggest that it may be time for the Joint Chiefs to take Bush and his cabal to the woodhsed:

Could it work? Maybe; in such business, there are no guarantees. Would the new Sunni coalition talk with us about a deal along these lines? It’s worth a try. Would the Bush administration make such an attempt? Aye, there’s the rub. The Bushbunker may be so detached from reality that it still thinks we can win this war militarily.

If that is the case, then it is time for America’s senior military leaders, the Chief and Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to have a little talk with the President. Another Vietnam war story, a true one, is how the JCS failed to give President Johnson the advice he needed though did not want, namely that the military had done all that it could and it was time to seek a political solution.


And ends with this:

So that’s my exit strategy. If someone else comes up with a better one, I will be happy to defer to it. But the time is past for arguing whether we need an exit strategy; the discussion should be about what that strategy might be. “Staying the course” in a lost war is not a strategy at all; it is merely a recipe for disaster.

Oh indeed, indeed!

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